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ABSTRACT
In mid-September 2008, a global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis erupted which was followed by the 
most serious worldwide economic recession 
for decades. As in many other regions of the 
world, governments in the euro area stepped 
in with a wide range of emergency measures 
to stabilise the ﬁ  nancial sector and to cushion 
the negative consequences for their economies. 
This paper examines how and to what extent 
these crisis-related interventions, as well as the 
fall-out from the recession, have had an impact 
on ﬁ  scal positions and endangered the longer-
term sustainability of public ﬁ  nances in the euro 
area and its member countries. The paper also 
discusses the appropriate design of ﬁ  scal exit 
and consolidation strategies in the context of 
the Stability and Growth Pact to ensure a rapid 
return to sound and sustainable budget positions. 
Finally, it reviews some early lessons from the 
crisis for the future conduct of ﬁ  scal policies in 
the euro area.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: E10, E62, G15, H30, H62
Key words: ﬁ  scal  policies,  ﬁ  nancial  crisis, 
ﬁ  scal stimulus, ﬁ  nancial markets, sustainability, 
Stability and Growth Pact.7
ECB




The ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis has had a very 
profound impact on public ﬁ  nances in the euro 
area. Projections suggest that the government 
deﬁ  cit in the euro area will climb to almost 7% of 
GDP in 2010 and that all euro area countries will 
then exceed the 3% of GDP limit. The euro area 
government debt-to-GDP ratio could increase to 
100% in the next years – and in some euro area 
countries well above that level – if governments 
do not take strong corrective action. These ﬁ  scal 
developments are all the more worrying in 
view of the projected ageing-related spending 
increases, which constitute a medium to 
long-term ﬁ  scal burden.
There is no doubt that the exceptional ﬁ  scal 
policy measures and monetary policy reaction 
to the crisis have helped to stabilise conﬁ  dence 
and the euro area economy. Following the 
substantial budgetary loosening, however, the 
ﬁ  scal exit from the crisis must be initiated in a 
timely manner and is to be followed by ambitious 
multi-year ﬁ  scal consolidation. This is necessary 
to underpin the public’s trust in the sustainability 
of public ﬁ   nances. The Stability and Growth 
Pact constitutes the mechanism to coordinate 
ﬁ  scal policies in Europe. The necessary ﬁ  scal 
adjustment to return to sound and sustainable 
ﬁ   scal positions is substantial and will take 
considerable efforts. Without doubt, this situation 
poses the biggest challenge so far for the rules-
based EU ﬁ  scal framework. 
Sound and sustainable public ﬁ   nances are a 
prerequisite for sustainable economic growth and 
a smooth functioning of Economic and Monetary 
Union. Therefore, it is important not to miss the 
right moment to correct the unsustainable deﬁ  cit 
and debt levels. A continuation of high public 
sector borrowing without the credible prospect 
of a return to sustainable public ﬁ  nances could 
have severe consequences for long-term interest 
rates, for economic growth, for the stability of 
the euro area and, therefore, not least for the 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank.   
Jürgen Stark
Member of the Executive Board 
and the Governing Council of the ECB 8
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SUMMARY 1
In mid-September 2008, a global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis erupted which was followed by the most 
serious worldwide economic recession for 
many decades. As in many other parts of the 
world, governments in the euro area stepped 
in with emergency measures to stabilise the 
ﬁ   nancial sector and to cushion the negative 
consequences for their economies, in parallel 
with a swift relaxation of monetary policy 
by the European Central Bank (ECB). This 
Occasional Paper examines to what extent 
these crisis-related interventions, as well as 
the fall-out from the recession, have had an 
impact on the ﬁ  scal position of the euro area 
and its member countries and endangered the 
longer-term sustainability of public ﬁ  nances. 
Chapter 2 of this paper reviews how euro area 
governments responded to the ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
and provides estimates of the impact of their 
interventions on public ﬁ   nances. The direct 
ﬁ   scal costs of all the bank rescue operations 
in the euro area are substantial and may rise 
further in view of large contingent liabilities 
in the form of state guarantees provided to 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. Notwithstanding the high 
direct  ﬁ  scal costs, taxpayers greatly beneﬁ  ted 
from the stabilisation of the ﬁ  nancial system and 
the economy at large. This in turn increases the 
chances that in due time governments will be 
able to exit from the banking sector, allow the 
state guarantees to expire and sell the acquired 
ﬁ   nancial sector assets at a proﬁ   t rather than 
a loss.
The ﬁ  nancial crisis also contributed to a rapid 
weakening of economic activity, leading to 
the sharpest output contraction since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Chapter 3 examines 
how euro area ﬁ   scal policies responded to 
this economic crisis with a view to sustaining 
domestic demand while also strengthening the 
supply side of the economy. The European 
Economic Recovery Plan of end-2008 established 
a common framework for counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal 
policy actions, whereby each Member State was 
invited to contribute, taking account of its own 
needs and room for manoeuvre. Governments 
were asked, in particular, to ensure a timely, 
targeted and temporary ﬁ  scal stimulus and to 
coordinate their actions so as to multiply their 
positive impact. As it turns out, these criteria 
seem at best to have been only partially met. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of such ﬁ  scal 
activism is widely debated.
Chapter 4 reviews the reaction of ﬁ  nancial 
markets to the concomitant rapid deterioration 
of public ﬁ  nances in the euro area countries. 
As the crisis intensiﬁ   ed, a general “ﬂ  ight 
to safety” was seen, with investors moving 
away from more risky private ﬁ  nancial assets 
(in particular equity and lower-rated corporate 
bonds) into safer government paper. As a 
result, most euro area governments have been 
able to ﬁ  nance their sizeable new debt issuance 
under rather favourable market conditions. 
At the same time, the governments’ strong 
commitment to assist distressed systemic banks 
helped to contain the rise in credit default 
spreads for ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms in the euro area. In 
effect, their credit risks were largely taken 
over by the taxpayers, as de facto governments 
stood ready to be the provider of bank capital 
of last resort. Reﬂ   ecting a parallel “ﬂ  ight  to 
quality”, markets also tended to discriminate 
more clearly between euro area countries based 
on their perceived creditworthiness. Within 
the euro area, this reassessment of sovereign 
default risks contributed to a signiﬁ  cant 
widening of government bond yield spreads, 
notably for those countries with relatively high 
(actual or expected) government deﬁ  cits  and/
or debt relative to GDP, large budgetary risks 
associated with the contingent liabilities from 
state guarantees and a less favourable economic 
outlook. 
As described in Chapter 5, the crisis-related 
deterioration of ﬁ  scal positions has called the 
longer-term sustainability of public ﬁ  nances 
into question. The risks to ﬁ  scal sustainability 
are manifold. They arise from persistently 
high primary budget deﬁ  cits in the event that 
Prepared by Ad van Riet. 1 9
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SUMMARY
ﬁ  scal stimulus packages are not fully reversed, 
ongoing government spending growth in the 
face of a prolonged period of more subdued 
output growth, rising government bond yields 
and thus increasing debt servicing costs, 
and possible budget payouts related to state 
guarantees to ﬁ   nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations. Furthermore, rising government 
indebtedness may itself trigger higher interest 
rates and contribute to lower growth, creating 
a negative feedback loop. These challenges for 
public ﬁ  nances are compounded by the expected 
rising costs from ageing populations. To contain 
these risks, euro area countries will need to 
realign their ﬁ  scal policies so as to bring their 
debt ratios back onto a steadily declining path 
and limit the debt servicing burden for future 
generations. 
Chapter 6 discusses the exit from the crisis mode 
and the crisis-related challenges for the EU 
ﬁ   scal framework. Pointing to the exceptional 
circumstances and responding to the call for 
a coordinated ﬁ  scal stimulus, many euro area 
countries have exploited the maximum degree 
of ﬂ  exibility offered by the Stability and Growth 
Pact in designing their national responses to the 
economic crisis and allowing for higher budget 
deﬁ  cits. At the end of 2009, 13 out of the 16 euro 
area countries were subject to excessive deﬁ  cit 
procedures, with (extended) deadlines to return 
deﬁ  cits to below the reference value of 3% of 
GDP ranging from 2010 to 2014. In this context, 
the design and implementation of optimal ﬁ  scal 
exit and consolidation strategies have taken 
centre stage. These strategies should comprise 
scaling down and gradually exiting from the 
bank rescue operations, phasing out the ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures and correcting excessive 
deﬁ   cits. The appropriate timing, pace and 
composition of the ﬁ   scal adjustment process, 
to be coordinated within the framework of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, are key to sustaining 
the public’s conﬁ  dence in ﬁ  scal policies and the 
way out of the crisis. 
Finally, Chapter 7 seeks to draw some early 
lessons from the crisis for the future conduct 
of euro area ﬁ  scal policies. Most importantly, 
a strengthening of ﬁ   scal discipline will be 
needed to ensure the longer-term sustainability 
of public ﬁ  nances, which is a vital condition 
for the stability and smooth functioning of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).10
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1 INTRODUCTION  2
In mid-2007, the ﬁ  rst signs of increasing turmoil 
in global ﬁ   nancial markets became visible. 
They were related to a rapidly intensifying 
crisis in the US sub-prime mortgage market, 
which negatively affected the value of related 
structural  ﬁ   nancial products held by banks 
and other ﬁ   nancial institutions all over the 
world. While initially the consequences for 
European banks were perceived to be largely 
conﬁ   ned to a few heavily exposed ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (and the ECB was quick to 
provide the necessary liquidity to the euro area 
banking system), the uncertainty over the true 
exposure of the banking sector lingered on.
In the following months, several large ﬁ  nancial 
institutions in the United States and the United 
Kingdom had to ﬁ  le for bankruptcy, or had to 
be rescued by their respective governments. 
In mid-September 2008, after the default of 
the investment bank Lehman Brothers in the 
United States, the ﬁ  nancial crisis escalated and 
many “systemic” (i.e. systemically important) 
European ﬁ  nancial institutions were faced with 
severe liquidity problems and massive asset 
write-downs. In this emergency situation, both 
conﬁ  dence in and the proper functioning of the 
whole ﬁ  nancial system were at stake. 
To stabilise the situation, a comprehensive set 
of measures was agreed at the European level.3 
In particular, the European G8 members at 
their summit in Paris on 4 October 2008 jointly 
committed to ensure the soundness and stability 
of their banking and ﬁ  nancial systems and to 
take all the necessary measures to achieve this 
objective. Furthermore, at an extraordinary 
summit on 12 October 2008, the Heads of 
State or Government of the euro area countries 
set out a concerted European Action Plan to 
restore conﬁ  dence in and the proper functioning 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. The principles of this 
action plan were subsequently endorsed by the 
European Council on 15-16 October 2008.
Whereas the ECB and other European central 
banks had already taken ﬁ  rm action to prevent 
liquidity shortages in the banking sector, the 
task to ensure the solvency of the affected 
systemic  ﬁ   nancial institutions rested with the 
national governments.4  From end September 
2008 onwards they undertook substantial bank 
rescue operations, designed to meet national 
requirements, but within an EU-coordinated 
framework, committed to take due account of 
the interests of taxpayers and to safeguard the 
sustainability of public ﬁ   nances. As in many 
other regions of the world, governments in the 
euro area also stepped in with a range of ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures to cushion the negative 
consequences of the crisis for their economies. 
The common framework for these national 
counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal policies was provided by 
the European Economic Recovery Plan, which 
the European Commission launched on 
26 November 2008 and the European Council 
approved on 11-12 December 2008. 
While all these emergency measures appear 
to have been successful in averting a possible 
collapse of the ﬁ   nancial system and in 
supporting short-term domestic demand, they 
entailed very high direct ﬁ  scal costs. Moreover, 
the abrupt fall in economic activity has led to 
a rapid rise in government deﬁ  cits and debt in 
all euro area countries. On unchanged ﬁ  scal 
policies, the rise in government debt-to-GDP 
ratios is set to continue, even as the recovery 
takes hold and the short-term ﬁ  scal  stimulus 
measures are phased out. Taken together, the 
dramatic increase in ﬁ  scal  imbalances,  the 
accumulation of extensive contingent liabilities 
related to the crisis response measures and 
the many uncertainties surrounding the future 
Prepared by Ad van Riet. 2 
At the international level, the ﬁ  nance ministers and central bank  3 
governors of the G7 countries agreed on 10 October 2008 to use 
all available tools to prevent the failure of systemically important 
ﬁ   nancial institutions, to take all necessary steps to unfreeze 
credit and money markets, to ensure that banks can raise 
sufﬁ  cient capital from public and private sources, and to ensure 
that national deposit insurance and guarantee programmes are 
robust and continue to support conﬁ  dence in the safety of retail 
deposits. These actions were to be taken in ways that protect the 
taxpayers. The leaders of the G20 countries committed at their 
Washington summit of 15 November 2008, among other steps, 
to take whatever further actions are necessary to stabilise the 
ﬁ  nancial system.
For a discussion of this distribution of tasks in a ﬁ  nancial crisis,  4 
see e.g. Hellwig (2007).11
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1   INTRODUCTION
path of growth and interest rates have put the 
longer-term sustainability of public ﬁ  nances in 
danger. 
The aim of this paper is to offer an overview of 
how public ﬁ  nances in the euro area countries 
and the euro area as a whole have been affected 
by the crisis, what risks to ﬁ  scal sustainability 
have emerged and what lessons may be drawn 
at this stage for euro area ﬁ  scal  policies. 
The paper is organised as follows. Following 
this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews how euro 
area  ﬁ   scal authorities have responded to the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis and what the direct impact was 
on their public ﬁ  nances. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
reaction of ﬁ  scal policy-makers to the economic 
downturn, the effectiveness of ﬁ  scal  stimulus 
measures and the importance of automatic ﬁ  scal 
stabilisers as a ﬁ  rst line of defence. Chapter 4 
discusses how ﬁ   nancial markets have reacted 
to the rapidly changing outlook for public 
ﬁ  nances across euro area countries. Against this 
background, Chapter 5 examines the risks to the 
longer-term sustainability of public ﬁ  nances and 
the corresponding debt dynamics under various 
scenarios. Chapter 6 asks what challenges 
the crisis has brought for the application of 
the legal provisions of the EU Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact which aim to ensure 
ﬁ   scal sustainability. In this context, it also 
discusses the design of appropriate ﬁ  scal exit 
and consolidation strategies for a rapid return to 
sound and sustainable ﬁ  scal positions. Finally, 
Chapter 7 considers what early lessons from the 
crisis may be drawn for the future conduct of 
ﬁ  scal policies in the euro area countries. 12
ECB
Occasional Paper No 109
April 2010
2  EURO AREA FISCAL POLICIES: 
RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  5
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although the start of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
is commonly set at mid-2007, in its early 
stages the implications for Europe were largely 
perceived as rather limited. Initially only a few 
banks were affected, particularly those which 
were dependent on the wholesale markets 
for their ﬁ   nancing or had either investments 
in structured ﬁ   nance products or substantial 
off-balance-sheet structures.6 In September 2008, 
particularly after the default of the US 
investment bank Lehman Brothers, the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil intensiﬁ  ed and an increasing 
number of European ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
experienced serious liquidity problems and 
were forced to undertake massive asset 
write-downs, with negative implications for 
their own credit quality (for more details, see 
ECB 2009a). 
In response to the ﬁ  nancial crisis – following the 
actions taken by the ECB and other European 
central banks to ensure the liquidity of the 
ﬁ   nancial system – European G8 members at 
their summit in Paris on 4 October 2008 jointly 
committed to ensure the soundness and stability 
of their banking and ﬁ  nancial systems and to 
take all the necessary measures to achieve this 
objective. The leaders of all 27 EU countries 
agreed on a similar statement on 6 October 2008, 
also stressing that each of them would take 
the necessary steps to reinforce bank deposit 
protection schemes. At the ECOFIN Council 
meeting of 7 October 2008, the ministers of 
ﬁ   nance of the Member States agreed on EU 
common guiding principles to restore both 
conﬁ  dence in and the proper functioning of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector. National measures in support of 
systemic ﬁ  nancial institutions would be adopted 
in principle for a limited time period and within 
a coordinated framework, while taking due 
regard of the interests of taxpayers. At the same 
time, the ECOFIN Council agreed to lift the 
coverage of national deposit guarantee schemes 
to a level of at least EUR 50,000, acknowledging 
that some Member States were to raise their 
minimum to EUR 100,000. Following the 
adoption of their concerted European Action 
Plan on 12 October 2008, the principles of 
which were endorsed by the European Council 
a few days later, euro area countries announced 
(additional) national measures to support 
their ﬁ  nancial systems and ensure appropriate 
ﬁ   nancing conditions for the economy as a 
prerequisite for growth and employment. 
This chapter analyses the response of euro area 
ﬁ   scal policies to the ﬁ   nancial crisis and the 
direct impact of government support to the 
banking sector on euro area public ﬁ  nances.7 
In addition to the consequences for government 
deﬁ  cits and debt, the assessment needs to take 
account of governments’ explicit and implicit 
contingent liabilities arising from the substantial 
state guarantees that have been provided. 
A comprehensive assessment of the implications 
of ﬁ  nancial sector support for public ﬁ  nances 
also requires a forward-looking perspective. 
The exit strategies that governments will adopt 
once conﬁ  dence in and the proper functioning 
of the ﬁ  nancial sector have been restored and in 
particular their success in recovering the direct 
ﬁ  scal costs will determine the long-term impact 
on public ﬁ  nances. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section  2.2 
brieﬂ   y reviews the euro area governments’ 
interventions to support the ﬁ  nancial  sector. 
Section 2.3 analyses the direct impact of these 
interventions on the accounts of euro area 
governments since the onset of the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. In addition, it discusses the net ﬁ  scal 
Prepared by Maria Grazia Attinasi. 5 
In the second half of 2007 IKB in Germany and Northern Rock  6 
in the United Kingdom had to be rescued as a consequence of 
the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. IKB suffered losses owing 
to its exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage market, whereas 
Northern Rock had difﬁ  culties in obtaining funding from the 
interbank market. Furthermore, in Germany, in the ﬁ  rst  half 
of 2008, two state-owned banks, WestLB AG and Bayern LB, 
faced liquidity problems due to their exposure to the US 
sub-prime mortgage market and received support from their 
federal states.
For an earlier review of the impact of government support to the  7 
banking sector on euro area public ﬁ  nances, see ECB (2009b) 
and European Commission (2009b, 2009c and 2009d).13
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2   EURO AREA 
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costs, taking account of the recovery rates of the 
bank support measures. Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2  PUBLIC INTERVENTIONS TO SUPPORT 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The EU common guiding principles agreed by 
the ECOFIN Council on 7 October 2008 and the 
concerted European Action Plan of the euro area 
countries adopted on 12 October 2008 paved the 
way for exceptional national measures as part of 
a coordinated effort at the EU level to deal with 
the implications of the unfolding ﬁ  nancial crisis.8 
Initially, public support targeted the liabilities 
side of banks’ balance sheets and consisted 
of: (i) government guarantees for interbank 
lending and new debt issued by the banks; 
(ii) recapitalisation of ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
in difﬁ   culty including through injections of 
government capital and nationalisation as an 
ultimate remedy; and (iii) increased coverage of 
the retail deposit insurance schemes. 
Between end-September and end-October 2008, 
several euro area countries announced bank 
rescue schemes which complemented the 
exceptional liquidity support provided by the 
ECB. In order to ensure respect of the EU state 
aid rules the European Commission provided 
guidance on how to design these measures.9 
In particular, measures under (i) and (ii) should 
avoid any discrimination against ﬁ  nancial 
institutions based in other Member States and 
should ensure that beneﬁ   ciary banks do not 
unfairly attract new additional business solely 
as a result of the government support. Support 
should also be targeted, temporary, and designed 
in such a way as to minimise negative spill-over 
effects on competitors and/or other Member 
States. Guarantee schemes should moreover 
ensure a signiﬁ   cant contribution from the 
beneﬁ  ciaries and/or the sector to cover the costs 
of the guarantee and of government intervention 
if the guarantee is called. As to recapitalisation 
measures, depending on the instrument chosen 
(e.g. shares, warrants), governments must 
receive adequate rights and appropriate 
remuneration as a counterpart for public  support. 
The ECB has provided speciﬁ  c guidelines on 
the pricing of both guarantees and recapitalisation 
measures.10 
Although all countries have acted within the 
framework set up by the European Action 
Plan and by the subsequent Commission 
Communications and ECB guidelines, the 
speciﬁ   c modalities have differed across 
countries. Whereas some countries adopted, 
since the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, broad-based 
schemes consisting of both guarantees and 
recapitalisation measures (Germany, Austria, 
Greece, Spain, France and the Netherlands), 
some other countries did not announce a general 
scheme, but carried out ad hoc interventions to 
support or even nationalise individual ﬁ  nancial 
institutions as a way to address speciﬁ  c banks’ 
solvency threats (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Ireland). Over and above 
guarantees and recapitalisation measures 
some governments have adopted sui generis 
schemes consisting of asset purchase schemes, 
debt assumption/cancellation, temporary swap 
arrangements (e.g. Spain, the Netherlands and 
Italy) and blanket guarantees on all deposits 
and debts of both domestic banks and foreign 
subsidiaries (Ireland). In addition, some 
euro area countries incorporated ﬁ  nancial 
incentives for early repayment in their support 
packages, or they added speciﬁ  c conditions to 
the support, such as the obligation to provide 
credit to the economy. In order to ensure that 
government support is limited to the minimum 
necessary and it does not become too protracted, 
At that point in time, some euro area governments already had  8 
announced emergency measures to deal with the rising pressure 
on their national banking systems. For a detailed overview 
of the ﬁ  nancial crisis measures introduced by the 27 Member 
States from 1 October 2008 to 1 June 2009, see Petrovic and 
Tutsch (2009). 
The European Commission has adopted the following  9 
Communications: (i) the Banking Communication, OJ C 270, 
25 October 2008; (ii) the Recapitalisation Communication, 
OJ C 10, 15 January 2009; and (iii) the Communication on the 
return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures 
in the ﬁ  nancial sector in the current crisis under the state aid 
rules, OJ C 195, 19 August 2009. 
For the recommendations issued by the Eurosystem, see:  10 
(i) recommendations on government guarantees for bank debt 
(www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_guaranteesen.pdf); 
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the Commission required each Member State 
to undertake a review of the (guarantee and 
recapitalisation) scheme every six months. 
Governments have also the opportunity to 
amend the original scheme in case the evolution 
in the situation of ﬁ  nancial markets so requires. 
In early 2009 public support to the banking 
sector began to target the assets side of banks’ 
balance sheets, with the aim of providing 
relief for impaired bank assets. This support 
complemented existing measures and was 
mainly motivated by the persisting uncertainty 
regarding asset valuations and the risk that 
new asset write-downs could impair banks’ 
balance sheets, thus undermining conﬁ  dence 
in the banking sector. Asset relief schemes 
include: (i) asset removal schemes, which aim at 
removing impaired assets from a bank’s balance 
sheet either via direct government purchases 
or by transferring them to independent asset 
management companies (which are sometimes 
referred to as “bad banks”); and (ii) asset 
insurance schemes which keep the assets on the 
banks’ balance sheets but insure them against 
tail risk. 
Asset relief schemes are regulated by the guiding 
principles issued by the Eurosystem and the 
European Commission in February 2009.11 Asset 
relief measures should aim at the attainment 
of the following objectives: (i) safeguarding 
ﬁ  nancial stability and restoring the provision of 
credit to the private sector while limiting moral 
hazard; (ii) ensuring that a level playing ﬁ  eld 
within the single market is maintained to the 
maximum extent possible; and (iii) containing 
the impact of possible asset support measures 
on public ﬁ  nances. 
Ireland announced the creation of a National 
Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in 
April 2009. The NAMA, which will be classiﬁ  ed 
as a special-purpose entity outside the government 
accounts, will buy as from March 2010 risky 
loans from participating banks at a signiﬁ  cant 
discount in order to improve the quality of the 
banks’ balance sheets. In payment for the loans 
the banks will receive government securities and/
or guaranteed securities. However, should the 
NAMA incur a loss or liability, the participating 
banks will indemnify the agency.12 The Spanish 
Fund for Ordered Bank Restructuring (FROB) 
was established in June 2009, in order to support 
the restructuring of banks whose ﬁ  nancial 
viability is at risk. The FROB will temporarily 
replace the directors of the affected institution 
and will submit a restructuring plan to the Banco 
de España aimed at a merger with another 
institution or at an overall or partial transfer of 
assets and liabilities to another institution. 
The FROB may grant funding to the affected 
institution or acquire its assets or shares. 
The German asset relief scheme was established 
in July 2009 and complements the existing 
measures for banking sector support. It involves 
exchanging ﬁ  nancial instruments including asset-
backed securities and collateralised debt 
obligations for bonds that would be backed by 
the state, with banks paying a fee for the 
guarantees. 
The tables below provide a cumulated overview 
of the ﬁ   nancial sector stabilisation measures 
carried out by euro area governments in 2008 
and 2009. Table 1 summarises all government 
interventions conducted in the form of capital 
injections, asset purchases and other measures, 
subtracting some early redemptions of loans 
and debt repayments. Table 2 summarises the 
amount of contingent liabilities assumed by euro 
area governments, including the debt issued by 
special-purpose entities (SPEs) which is covered 
by state guarantees. At the euro area level, the 
total amount committed is at least 20% of GDP 
(i.e. the ceiling for guarantees and all other 
support measures). 
See Eurosystem Guiding Principles for Bank Support  11 
Schemes: www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/guidingprinciplesbank
assetsupportschemesen.pdf; and Commission Communication 
on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community 
Banking Sector: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
legislation/impaired_assets.pdf. See also European Commission 
Communication on Impaired Assets, OJ C 72, 26 March 2009.
The circumstances under which the participating institutions  12 
have to indemnify the NAMA in case of losses or liabilities are 
speciﬁ  ed in the NAMA legislation. As to the speciﬁ  c modality, 
it may take the form of a tax surcharge on the proﬁ  ts of the 
participating banks. 15
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Table 1 Cumulated financial sector stabilisation operations and their impact 
on government debt 
(2008-2009; percentage of 2009 GDP)















Belgium 4.2 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 6.4 6.4
Germany 1.8 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 3.5 2.2
Ireland 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0
Greece 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0
Spain 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.9
France 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6
Italy 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 6.4
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 6.3 1.3 3.5 0.0 0.2 11.3 13.7
Austria 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.3
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 3.6 4.1 0.0
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Euro area 1.4 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.0
Table 2 Cumulated financial sector stabilisation operations and their impact on government 
contingent liabilities
(2008-2009; percentage of 2009 GDP)
Measures impacting government contingent liabilities (2008-2009) Guarantees 
on retail deposits 
(€ or % of retail 
deposits)













Belgium  1.3 12.8  0.0 14.2 10.4  26.7  100,000 
Germany  0.0 9.9 0.0 9.9 2.7  18.3  100% 
Ireland  0.0 172.0  0.0 172.0 206.8  172.0  100% 
Greece  0.0 1.2 1.9 3.1 0.8  9.5 100,000 
Spain  0.0 4.8 0.0 4.8 0.0  19.1 100,000 
France  4.7 1.1 0.0 5.8 1.8  16.7  70,000 
Italy  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  circa  103,000 
Cyprus  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 100,000 
Luxembourg  0.0 7.9 0.0 7.9  11.4  0.0 100,000 
Malta  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 100,000 
Netherlands  0.0 13.7  0.0 13.7  0.5  34.8  100,000 
Austria  0.4 7.6 0.0 8.0 2.5  27.5  100% 
Portugal  0.0 3.3 0.0 3.3 1.1  12.3 100,000 
Slovenia  0.0 5.6 0.0 5.6 0.0  33.5  100% 
Slovakia  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  100% 
Finland  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1  28.8  50,000 
Euro  area  1.1 8.3 0.1 9.4 5.7  20.1   
Source: European System of Central Banks (national sources for retail deposit guarantees).
Notes: These tables have been compiled on the basis of the statistical recording principles for public interventions described in Box 1. 
The cut-off date was 18 January 2010. For Ireland the lower ceiling on guarantees compared with the total impact in 2008 is explained 
by the fall in the value of covered bank liabilities between 2008 and 2009. Data on contingent liabilities do not include the retail deposit 
guarantees reported in the last column of Table 2.16
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Box 1
THE STATISTICAL RECORDING OF PUBLIC INTERVENTIONS TO SUPPORT THE FINANCIAL SECTOR  1 
On 15 July 2009 Eurostat published a decision on the statistical recording of public interventions 
to support ﬁ   nancial institutions and ﬁ   nancial markets during the ﬁ   nancial crisis. This box 
summarises these recording principles. 
The public interventions in support of the ﬁ  nancial sector covered a wide range of operations. 
Eurostat has based its statistical recording on the established principles of the European System of 
Accounts 1995 (ESA 95), which have been applied to the speciﬁ  c circumstances of the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Statistical recording principles 
Recapitalisations of banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions through purchases of new equity at 
market prices are recorded as ﬁ  nancial transactions without any (immediate) impact on the 
government deﬁ  cit/surplus. If the purchase takes place above the market price, a capital transfer 
for the difference is recorded, thereby negatively affecting the government budget balance. 
The purchase of unquoted shares in banks (such as preferred shares) is recorded as a ﬁ  nancial 
transaction as long as the transaction is expected to yield a sufﬁ  cient rate of return under 
EU state aid rules. 
Loans are recorded as ﬁ  nancial transactions at the time they are granted, if there is no irrefutable 
evidence that the loans will not be repaid. Any subsequent cancellations or forgiveness of loans 
will lead to a recording of a capital transfer. 
Asset purchases involve the acquisition of existing (possibly impaired) assets from ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. The market value of some assets may be difﬁ  cult to determine. In this respect, 
Eurostat has decided on a speciﬁ  c “decision tree” for valuing securities. In short, if the purchase 
price paid by government is above the market price (the latter being determined as the price 
either a) on an active market or b) at an auction, or determined c) by the accounting books of the 
seller or d) by a valuation of an independent entity), a capital transfer for the difference between 
the purchase price and the market price has to be recorded. If the assets are sold later, under 
similar market conditions, but at a lower price than the purchase price paid by government, the 
price difference should be recorded as a capital transfer. 
Government securities lent or swapped without cash collateral in temporary liquidity schemes 
are not counted as government debt; neither are government guarantees, which are contingent 
liabilities in national accounts. Provisions made for losses on guarantees are not recorded in the 
national accounts. A call on a guarantee will usually result in the government making a payment 
to the original creditors or assuming a debt. In both cases, a capital transfer will be recorded from 
government for the amount called.
Recapitalisations, loans and asset purchases increase government debt if the government has to 
borrow to ﬁ  nance these operations. Interest and dividend payments, as well as fees received for 
securities lent and guarantees provided, improve the government budget balance. 
1  Prepared by Julia Catz and Henri Maurer.17
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Classiﬁ  cation of new units and re-routing 
Governments have in some cases created new units or used existing units outside the general 
government sector to support ﬁ   nancial institutions. This raises two additional issues: ﬁ  rst, 
the sector classiﬁ  cation of the new unit must be determined (i.e. outside or inside the general 
government sector); second, even if the unit is classiﬁ  ed outside the general government sector, 
certain transactions carried out by this unit may need to be re-routed through the government 
accounts.
For the sector classiﬁ  cation of a newly created entity, Eurostat has decided that government-
owned special-purpose entities, which have as their purpose to conduct speciﬁ  c government 
policies and which have no autonomy of decision, are classiﬁ  ed within the government sector. 
On the contrary, majority privately-owned special-purpose entities with a temporary duration, set 
up with the sole purpose to address the ﬁ  nancial crisis, are to be recorded outside the government 
sector if the expected losses that they will bear are small in comparison with the total size of their 
liabilities. 
As to the rescue operations undertaken by a public corporation classiﬁ   ed outside general 
government, Eurostat has decided that these operations should be subject to re-arrangement 
through the government accounts (with a concomitant deterioration of government balance and 
debt), if there is evidence that the government has instructed the public corporation to carry 
out the operations. In the speciﬁ  c case of central bank liquidity operations, these operations 
fall within the remit of central banks to preserve ﬁ  nancial stability and therefore should not be 
re-routed through the government accounts. 
In its October 2009 press release on government deﬁ  cit and debt, Eurostat also published 
supplementary information on the activities undertaken by the European governments to support 
the ﬁ  nancial sector (e.g. government guarantees, the debt of special-purpose entities classiﬁ  ed 
outside the government sector, temporary liquidity schemes). This is essential to gauge the ﬁ  scal 
risks arising from governments’ contingent liabilities and the liabilities of newly created units 
that are classiﬁ  ed inside the private sector. 
2.3  THE NET FISCAL COSTS OF BANK SUPPORT 
An assessment of the net ﬁ   scal costs of 
government support to the banking sector 
requires a long horizon, which goes beyond 
the year in which such support was effectively 
provided. In the short term, the (net) impact of 
the various measures to support the ﬁ  nancial 
sector on the government deﬁ  cits has so far 
been very small (i.e. below 0.1% of GDP for 
the euro area as a whole). The direct impact 
on government debt levels will strictly 
depend on the borrowing requirements of the 
governments to ﬁ  nance the rescue operations 
(see Box 1). As can be seen in Table 1, euro 
area government debt on balance increased 
by 2.5% of GDP by the end of 2009 due to 
the stabilisation measures. At the country 
level, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands witnessed the most noticeable 
increases in government debt by 6.4%, 6.7%, 
6.6% and 11.3% of GDP, respectively. In the 
case of France, the relatively small impact 
on government debt (i.e. 0.4% of GDP) is 
due to Eurostat’s decision on the statistical 
classiﬁ   cation of majority privately-owned 
special-purpose entities, set up with the 
sole purpose to address the ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
(see Box 1). Following this decision, the Société 
de Financement de l’Économie Française 
(SFEF) is recorded outside the government 
sector. As a result, the amounts borrowed by 18
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the SFEF with a government guarantee do not 
affect the general government debt, but only its 
contingent liabilities. 
In addition to the direct impact on deﬁ  cits and 
debt, the assessment of the ﬁ  scal implications 
of bank rescue operations needs to take account 
of the broader ﬁ   scal risks governments have 
assumed as a result of such operations. Although 
their effect may not be visible in the short term, 
such ﬁ  scal risks may have an adverse impact 
on  ﬁ   scal solvency over the medium to long 
term (see also Chapter 5). As a result of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, governments have assumed two 
fundamental types of ﬁ  scal risks. 
The  ﬁ   rst is related to the governments’ 
contingent liabilities (e.g. further guarantees 
and/or recapitalisations may be required).13 
By the end of 2009 the implicit contingent 
liabilities related to the ﬁ  nancial rescue measures 
represented at least 20% of GDP for euro area 
governments (excluding government guarantees 
on retail deposits; see Table 2). The potential 
ﬁ   scal risks are sizeable for all countries that 
have provided a guarantee scheme. 
The government of Ireland has taken on more 
implicit contingent liabilities than any other 
euro area government (around 172% of GDP, 
excluding a blanket guarantee on retail deposits). 
At the end of 2009 state guarantees available to 
the ﬁ  nancial sector expired in some euro area 
countries, while they were extended in most 
others. The explicit contingent liabilities from 
state guarantees that were actually provided to 
the banks and special-purpose entities on 
balance amount to about 9.4% of GDP 
(see Table 2). Accordingly, by end-2009, less 
than half of the total amounts committed had 
been effectively used. The probability that such 
explicit ﬁ  scal risks will materialise depends on 
the credit default risk of the ﬁ  nancial institutions 
that made use of the guarantees. 
The second source of ﬁ  scal risks relates to the 
effects of ﬁ   nancial sector support measures 
(e.g. bank recapitalisations, asset purchases 
and loans) on the size and composition of 
governments’ balance sheets (see IMF 2009d). 
In principle, these interventions do not increase 
a government’s net debt, as they represent an 
acquisition of ﬁ  nancial assets. However, their 
ultimate impact on ﬁ  scal solvency will depend 
on how these assets are managed, on possible 
valuation changes which could negatively affect 
the net debt ratio, and on the proceeds from the 
future sale by governments of these ﬁ  nancial 
sector assets. As reported in Box 2, experience 
shows that the recovery rates tend to be well 
below 100%. 
The ﬁ  scal costs of support to the banking sector 
are partially offset by the dividends, interest and 
fees paid by the banks to the governments in 
exchange for ﬁ  nancial support. For some euro 
area countries, this is a considerable source 
of revenues. At the same time, this price tag 
attached to bank support provides market-based 
incentives for the ﬁ  nancial institutions involved 
to return the capital and loans received from the 
government and to issue debt securities without 
a government guarantee as market conditions 
normalise. Indeed, already in the course of 2009, 
several banks were able to repay the loans from 
government or to issue debt securities without a 
government guarantee. 
Finally, an assessment of the net ﬁ  scal costs of 
government support should also weigh these 
costs against the economic and social beneﬁ  ts 
of the interventions, as they were successful 
in stemming a collapse of the ﬁ  nancial system 
and a likely credit crunch. A quantiﬁ  cation of 
these beneﬁ  ts is difﬁ  cult as it would require an 
estimate of the output and job losses following 
the default of systemic ﬁ  nancial institutions and 
a breakdown of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
See ECB (2009g), Box 10 entitled “Estimate of potential future  13 
write-downs on securities and loans facing the euro area banking 
sector”. 19
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Box 2
THE FISCAL COSTS OF SELECTED PAST BANKING CRISES  1
Since the Second World War systemic banking crises have been relatively rare occurrences in 
developed countries and tended to be local in nature and related to country-speciﬁ  c imbalances. 
In this respect, the recent period of ﬁ  nancial turmoil is unprecedented, owing to its global reach, 
and this naturally limits the scope of comparability with past episodes. This notwithstanding, 
past experiences may offer useful guidance on appropriate crisis management and exit strategies. 
This box therefore reviews the common features of several past systemic banking crises and the 
medium-term ﬁ  scal costs of government interventions in advanced economies.2 
Banking crises frequently occurred in the aftermath of pro-cyclical policies, lax ﬁ  nancial 
regulation and exceptionally fast credit growth. In some cases, banks took excessive risks 
(often in the real estate or stock markets) during periods of strong economic growth, which then 
materialised when the economy was hit by major internal or external shocks. In other cases, 
ﬁ  nancial crises were related to the excessive dependence of banks on short-term ﬁ  nancing. 
Government intervention tended to be based on a combination of measures aimed at restoring 
conﬁ  dence in the ﬁ  nancial system and supporting the ﬂ  ow of credit to the domestic economy in 
order to prevent a credit crunch. A ﬁ  rst line of defence usually consisted of a guarantee fund or a 
blanket guarantee. The nature of the guarantees varied depending on country-speciﬁ  c conditions. 
Capital injections were also provided to those institutions facing liquidity or solvency problems 
for the purpose of restoring banks’ required capital ratios. In exchange, governments acquired 
ownership of bank shares or proceeded to outright nationalisation. Non-performing bank assets 
were in some cases removed from bank balance sheets and transferred to asset management 
companies, which would later sell these assets again. In the case of publicly owned asset 
management companies, the proceeds from the sale of assets partially offset the ﬁ  scal costs 
related to bank rescue operations. 
The estimated ﬁ  scal costs of government intervention in the banking sector vary substantially 
across studies depending on the methodology used for their derivation and the deﬁ  nition of 
ﬁ  scal costs.3 Some studies recognise only government outlays as ﬁ  scal costs, whereas others also 
take into account the revenue side of government ﬁ  nances. The literature identiﬁ  es three main 
channels through which to assess the ﬁ  scal costs of ﬁ  nancial instability,4 namely: (i) direct bailout 
costs (either excluding or including the future sale of ﬁ  nancial sector assets acquired by the 
government), (ii) a loss of tax revenues from lower capital gains, asset turnover and consumption, 
and (iii) second-round effects from asset price changes on the real economy and the cyclical 
component of the budget balance, and via government debt service costs. These ﬁ  scal costs have 
to be weighed against the economic and social beneﬁ  ts of stabilising the ﬁ  nancial sector.
1  Prepared by Maria Grazia Attinasi.
2  For more detailed analyses, see Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Laeven and Valencia (2008), Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002), 
Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2008) and Jonung (2009).
3  Two approaches to estimating ﬁ  scal costs can be applied. The bottom-up approach sums up all government measures related to a crisis, 
although some of these measures are difﬁ  cult to quantify, especially if they are carried out by institutions classiﬁ  ed outside the general 
government sector. This approach was followed in Laeven and Valencia (2008). The top-down approach starts with the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio before the crisis and assumes that any changes in the ratio are related to the ﬁ  nancial crisis. This approach, which 
also includes debt changes which are unrelated to the crisis, is followed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
4  See, for example, Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002).20
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The table above shows the estimated gross ﬁ  scal costs as well as the estimated recovery rates for 
selected past systemic banking crises in advanced economies (i.e. Finland, Japan, Norway and 
Sweden) using available estimates. Gross ﬁ  scal costs are estimated over a period of ﬁ  ve years 
following the occurrence of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. The highest ﬁ  scal costs were recorded in Japan 
(around 14% of GDP within ﬁ  ve years of the start of the crisis), while they were relatively 
modest in Norway and Sweden (around 3-4% of GDP).
The recovery rates in the last column of the above table indicate the portion of gross ﬁ  scal 
costs that governments were able to recover, by way of, for example, revenues from the sale of 
non-performing bank assets or from bank privatisations. Recovery rates usually vary signiﬁ  cantly 
across countries, depending on country-speciﬁ  c features, such as the modality of government 
intervention, the quality of acquired ﬁ  nancial sector assets, exchange rate developments and 
market conditions when the assets were sold by government. IMF estimates  5 show that Sweden 
was able to reach a recovery rate of 94.4% of budgetary outlays ﬁ  ve years after the 1991 crisis, 
while Japan had recovered only about 1% of the budgetary outlays ﬁ  ve years after the 1997 
crisis. However, by 2008 the recovery rate for Japan had increased to 54%.
The medium-term ﬁ  scal costs of ﬁ  nancial support depended to a large degree on the exit strategies 
governments adopted to reduce their involvement in the ﬁ  nancial system once the situation returned 
to normal and on the recovery rates from the sale of ﬁ  nancial assets. The exit strategies can be seen 
as comprehensive programmes to reverse anti-crisis measures taken during a ﬁ  nancial crisis. When 
deciding on an exit strategy, the key variables are timing (i.e. the moment and speed at which the 
government plans to phase out the measures, for example, by withdrawing government guarantees) 
and scale (i.e. the degree to which the government wishes to return to pre-crisis conditions, for 
example, by reducing government ownership in the banking sector). In the past banking crises 
reviewed in this box, concrete exit strategies were rarely speciﬁ  ed ex ante. If nationalisation of a 
substantial part of the banking sector occurred or the government acquired large amounts of assets, 
government holdings were sold once the crisis was over. As the Swedish experience shows,6 the 
key determinants for the successful management of a ﬁ  nancial crisis include swift policy action, 
an adequate legal and institutional framework for the resolution procedures, full disclosure of 
information by the parties involved, and a differentiated resolution policy that minimises moral hazard 
by forcing private sector participants to absorb losses before the government intervenes ﬁ  nancially.7 
5  IMF estimates show that average recovery rates for advanced economies are about 55% and are inﬂ  uenced, among other factors, by the 
soundness of the public ﬁ  nancial management framework. For more details, see IMF (2009a).
6  See Jonung (2009). 
7  Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) also ﬁ  nd that crisis management strategies have an impact on the ﬁ  scal costs of ﬁ  nancial crises. 
Their analysis shows that crisis management practices such as open-ended liquidity support, regulatory forbearance and an unlimited 
depositor guarantee lead to higher ﬁ  scal costs than less accommodating policy measures.
The fiscal costs of selected systemic banking crises
Country Starting 
date of crisis 
(t)
Gross ﬁ  scal costs 
after ﬁ  ve years 
(% of GDP)
Recovery of ﬁ  scal costs 
during period t to t+5 
(% of GDP)
Recovery of ﬁ  scal costs 
during period t to t+5 
(% of gross ﬁ  scal costs)
Finland September 1991 12.8 1.7 13.3
Japan November 1997 14.0 0.1 0.7
Norway October 1991 2.7 2.1 77.8
Sweden September 1991 3.6 3.4 94.4
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008).
Note: The starting date was identiﬁ  ed by Laeven and Valencia (2008) based on their deﬁ  nition of systemic banking crises.21
ECB
Occasional Paper No 109
April 2010
2   EURO AREA 
FISCAL POLICIES: 
RESPONSE TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The response of euro area governments to 
the  ﬁ   nancial crisis was timely, necessary 
and unprecedented. Governments acted in a 
coordinated manner, in respect of the temporary 
framework adopted under the EU state aid rules 
and within the guidelines issued by both the 
European Commission and the ECB/Eurosystem. 
Their interventions were successful in stemming 
a conﬁ   dence crisis in the ﬁ  nancial  sector  and 
averting major adverse consequences for the 
economy. 
Nonetheless, government support to the banking 
sector has substantial implications for ﬁ  scal 
policy. As discussed in this chapter, in addition to 
the direct impact on government accounts (i.e. the 
impact on deﬁ  cits and debt), a comprehensive 
assessment of the ﬁ   scal implications of bank 
support measures needs to take account of the 
broader ﬁ  scal risks governments have assumed 
as a result of these operations. Based upon the 
principles for the statistical recording of the 
public interventions, the impact on the euro area 
countries’ government deﬁ  cits has been limited 
so far, whereas the impact on gross debt levels 
has been substantial. Moreover, as a result of 
these interventions, governments have assumed 
signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  scal risks, which may threaten ﬁ  scal 
solvency in the medium to long term. The major 
sources of ﬁ  scal risks are possible further capital 
injections, guarantees to the banking sector 
which may be called and the increase in the 
size of governments’ balance sheets. The large 
amount of assets acquired by governments as a 
counterpart of support measures is vulnerable 
to valuation changes and to the potential losses 
that may result once these assets are disposed 
of. Therefore, looking ahead, the risk of the 
government debt ratio rising further cannot be 
ruled out. 
Finally, during the current crisis, a more indirect 
effect on ﬁ   scal policy has been at work as 
governments’ decision to support the banking 
sector has affected investors’ perceptions of 
countries’ creditworthiness. From a public 
ﬁ   nance point of view, these indirect effects 
are also relevant as increased risk aversion 
towards governments may reduce investors’ 
willingness to provide long-term funding to 
sovereign borrowers. This would adversely 
affect governments’ capacity to issue long-term 
debt and may impair the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances by way of higher debt servicing costs 
(see Chapter 4). 22
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In view of the expected economic fall-out 
from the ﬁ   nancial crisis, leaders of the G20 
countries at their Washington summit of 
15 November 2008 set out to “use ﬁ  scal stimulus 
measures to stimulate domestic demand to rapid 
effect, as appropriate, while maintaining a policy 
framework conducive to ﬁ  scal  sustainability”. 
On 26 November 2008, the European Commission 
launched the European Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP), with the aim to provide a coordinated 
short-term budgetary impulse to demand as well 
as to reinforce competitiveness and potential 
growth.15 The total package amounted to 
EUR 200 billion (1.5% of EU GDP), of which 
Member States were called upon to contribute 
around EUR 170 billion (1.2% of EU GDP) and 
EU and European Investment Bank (EIB) budgets 
around EUR 30 billion (0.3% of EU GDP). 
The stimulus measures would come in addition to 
the role of automatic ﬁ  scal stabilisers and should 
be consistent with the Stability and Growth Pact 
and the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs.
This chapter reviews how euro area ﬁ  scal policies 
responded to the economic crisis. Section 3.2 
discusses the size of the total ﬁ  scal impulse to 
the euro area economy and its impact on the 
budgetary position of the euro area. Drawing 
on the literature, Section 3.3 puts forward some 
considerations on the effectiveness of automatic 
ﬁ  scal stabilisers and discretionary ﬁ  scal policies 
for supporting output growth. Section 3.4 
concludes. 
3.2  THE FISCAL IMPULSE FOR THE EURO AREA 
ECONOMY
The budgetary support or ﬁ  scal impulse that the 
government can provide to the economy reﬂ  ects 
the initial momentum from public ﬁ  nances, as 
broadly captured by the year-on-year change 
in the general government budget balance as a 
share of GDP. The ﬁ  scal impulse can be broadly 
decomposed into three categories, comprising 
1) the operation of automatic ﬁ  scal stabilisers 
associated with the business cycle – equivalent 
to the change in the cyclical component of 
the budget; 2) the ﬁ   scal stance, consisting 
of discretionary ﬁ   scal policy measures and a 
number of non-policy factors – as captured by 
changes in the cyclically adjusted (or structural) 
primary balance; and 3) interest payments, 
which represent a ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ow between the 
government and other sectors in the economy, 
and therefore may also be seen as part of the 
ﬁ  scal impulse (see Chart 1).
In a cyclical downturn, the operation of automatic 
ﬁ  scal  stabilisers provides an automatic buffer 
to private demand through built-in features of 
the government budget. These reﬂ  ect above all 
rising unemployment and other social security 
beneﬁ   ts on the expenditure side and falling 
income from corporate, personal and indirect 
taxes on the revenue side. Conversely, in a 
cyclical upturn, the automatic features of the 
budget work in the opposite direction, thereby 
putting a brake on private demand.
The ﬁ  scal stance is commonly used to measure 
the impact of discretionary  ﬁ  scal  policies 
on government ﬁ  nances.  The  ﬁ  scal  stimulus 
packages, adopted by governments as a direct 
response to the economic crisis, form a subset 
of discretionary ﬁ  scal policies. The ﬁ  scal stance 
is, however, also affected by non-policy factors 
outside the control of government. Notably, 
difﬁ  culties in estimating the output gap in real 
time complicate the separation of cyclical and 
policy-related budget changes and could distort 
a proper measurement of the ﬁ  scal  stance 
(see e.g. Cimadomo, 2008). As shown by Morris 
et al. (2009), in the boom years before the 
crisis several euro area countries recorded large 
increases in tax revenues that could neither be 
explained by discretionary measures, nor by the 
development of typical tax base proxies. These 
windfall revenues are nevertheless registered 
as improving the cyclically adjusted primary 
Prepared by António Afonso, Cristina Checherita, Mathias  14 
Trabandt and Thomas Warmedinger. 
See European Commission, “A European Economic Recovery  15 
Plan”, COM(2008)800, 26.11.2008.23
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balance. Similarly, the reversal of these windfall 
revenues after the boom (leading to revenue 
shortfalls) is recorded as a deterioration in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance. Revenue 
windfalls/shortfalls may be caused, for example, 
by changes in asset prices, in the price of oil, 
or in households’ spending habits. On the 
expenditure side, such non-policy factors refer 
to government spending trends in excess of trend 
output growth. This could reﬂ   ect the in-built 
momentum of expenditures (e.g. public wages) 
or an unanticipated drop in trend growth.
Accommodating the impact of automatic 
stabilisers and implementing discretionary ﬁ  scal 
policies during the economic crisis has come at 
a very high cost for euro area public ﬁ  nances. 
The rapid deterioration of the ﬁ  scal outlook is 
illustrated in Chart 2. After having been close to 
balance in 2007, the euro area general government 
budget is projected to show a deﬁ  cit of 6.9% of 
GDP in 2010, caused by an upward shift in the 
spending ratio and a steady decline in revenue 
Chart 1 Overview of the fiscal impulse and its components
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Chart 2 Euro area budget balance and its 
components over the period 1998-2010
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relative to GDP. The analysis in Box 3 suggests 
that these euro area ﬁ  scal developments (apart 
from those on the revenue side) are broadly in line 
with those during past systemic ﬁ  nancial crises in 
a group of selected advanced economies.
Table 3 shows the detailed data underpinning 
the estimated size of the ﬁ   scal impulse and 
its components for the euro area. In line with 
Chart 2, the upper part of the table shows the 
main ﬁ  scal features of the euro area, showing a 
rapid deterioration of public ﬁ  nances. According 
to European Commission (2009b and 2009d) 
estimates, the ﬁ   scal stimulus packages for 
2009-10 adopted by euro area countries as a 
direct response to the economic crisis amount 
to almost 2.0% of GDP (of which 1.1% in 2009 
and 0.8% in 2010).
The analysis of the components of the ﬁ  scal 
impulse in the lower part of Table 3 is based 
on annual changes in GDP ratios, with the 
sign reversed such that a deterioration of the 
respective balance indicates a positive stimulus. 
The overall ﬁ  scal impulse to the euro area economy 
(as given by the decline in the government 
budget balance) is projected to have increased 
substantially in 2009 (by about 4.4 percentage 
points of GDP) and somewhat further in 2010 
(by about 0.5 percentage point of GDP). Taking a 
two-year perspective, out of the total ﬁ  scal 
impulse of 4.9 percentage points of GDP in 
2009-10, the effect of automatic stabilisers 
accounts for about half (2.4 percentage points 
of GDP), while the other half represents largely 
the loosening of the ﬁ  scal stance and to a minor 
extent the increase in interest expenditures. The 
ﬁ   scal stance reﬂ   ects the impact of the ﬁ  scal 
stimulus packages as well as signiﬁ  cant additional 
revenue shortfalls and structural spending growth 
in excess of the (lower) trend growth rate of the 
economy. 
Table 4 shows the total ﬁ   scal impulse and its 
components for euro area countries, as well as the 
size of their ﬁ  scal stimulus packages. The latter 
stems from a bottom-up aggregation of reported 
ﬁ   scal stimulus measures, some of which were 
already decided before the EERP. Such an 
aggregation is subject to considerable deﬁ  nition 
problems and therefore arbitrariness, because 
there is no clear distinction between ﬁ  scal stimulus 
measures in response to the crisis and government 
measures that would have been undertaken 
irrespective of the crisis. Moreover, some countries 
undertook separate consolidation measures. 
The dispersion of the ﬁ   scal stimulus size by 
country (as initially estimated by the European 
Commission: see last two columns of Table 4) 
is considerable, reﬂ   ecting in general the 
available budgetary room for manoeuvre and 
the perceived deterioration of the economic 
outlook. For 2009, the largest ﬁ  scal package was 
Table 3 The fiscal impulse and its components for the euro area
2008 2009 2010
Fiscal position (% of GDP)
Government budget balance  -2.0  -6.4  -6.9 
Cyclical component of budget balance  0.9  -1.4  -1.4 
Cyclically adjusted budget balance  -2.9  -5.0  -5.4 
Interest expenditures  3.0  3.0  3.2 
Cyclically adjusted primary balance  0.1  -2.0  -2.2 
Fiscal stimulus packages  - 1.1  0.8 
Fiscal impulse (annual changes, p.p. of GDP)
Change in government budget balance  -1.4  -4.4  -0.5 
Fiscal impulse  1.4  4.4  0.5 
o/w cyclical component – automatic stabilisers  0.3  2.4  0.0 
o/w cyclically adjusted primary balance – ﬁ  scal stance  1.0  2.1  0.2 
o/w interest expenditures  0.1  0.0  0.2 
Change in ﬁ  scal stimulus packages  - 1.1 -0.3 
Sources: European Commission (2009b and 2009f), ECB calculations.25
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adopted in Spain (2.3% of GDP), followed by 
Austria, Finland and Malta (with over 1.5% of 
GDP) and Germany (1.4% of GDP). For 2010, 
when most countries keep their stimulus 
measures in place in support of their economies, 
Germany stands out as new public investments 
raise the total size of the ﬁ   scal package to 
about 2% of GDP. One should note that a few 
countries have subsequently extended certain 
measures (France) or further expanded their 
total packages (Germany) for 2010. Countries 
that had less room for budgetary manoeuvre, 
in particular Greece and Italy, avoided taking 
discretionary ﬁ  scal measures as a response to 
the crisis that would raise their budget deﬁ  cits. 
Looking in more detail at the composition of 
the ﬁ  scal stimulus packages for the euro area, 
out of the total of 1.8% of GDP over the period 
2009-10, 1.0% of GDP is given by measures on 
the revenue side and 0.8% of GDP is accounted 
for by measures on the expenditure side. 
Four broad categories of measures in support 
of the economy have been adopted by euro area 
countries in 2009-10 (see Chart 3). 
Most governments took measures to support 
households’ purchasing power, especially 
through a reduction of direct taxes, social security 
contributions and VAT, as well as through direct 
aid, such as income support for households 
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(a) = (b) + (c) (b) (c) (d)
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
Belgium  1.0 4.7  -0.1 0.4 2.2 0.2 0.6 2.5  -0.3 0.4 0.4 
Germany  0.2 3.4 1.6  -0.2 3.0  -0.1 0.3 0.4 1.7 1.4 1.9 
Ireland  7.4 5.3 2.2 2.0 2.9 0.2 5.4 2.5 1.9 0.5 0.5 
Greece  4.1 4.9  -0.4 0.3 1.3 0.8 3.8 3.6  -1.3 0.0 0.0 
Spain  6.0 7.2  -1.1 0.3 1.6 0.3 5.7 5.6  -1.5 2.3 0.6 
France  0.7 4.9 0.0 0.5 1.7 0.0 0.1 3.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 
Italy  1.2 2.5 0.0 0.8 2.5  -0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Cyprus  2.5 4.4 2.2  -0.4 1.2 0.4 2.8 3.2 1.8 0.1 0.0 
Luxembourg 1.2 4.7 2.1 1.8 2.8 0.3  -0.5 1.9 1.7 1.2 1.4 
Malta  2.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3  1.1  0.0  2.8 -1.2 -0.1  1.6  1.6 
Netherlands -0.5 5.4 1.5  -0.2 3.2 0.2  -0.4 2.2 1.2 0.9 1.0 
Austria  -0.1 3.9 1.1  -0.2 2.4 0.2 0.1 1.5 1.0 1.8 1.8 
Portugal  0.1 5.3 0.1 0.3 1.3 0.0  -0.2 4.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 
Slovenia  1.8 4.5 0.7  -0.1 4.2 0.0 1.9 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 
Slovakia  0.4 4.0  -0.2  -0.5 2.9 0.4 0.9 1.0  -0.6 0.1 0.0 
Finland  0.8 7.3 1.7 0.6 4.1  -0.1 0.2 3.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 
Euro  area  1.4 4.4 0.5 0.3 2.4 0.0 1.1 2.1 0.4 1.1 0.8
Sources: European Commission (2009b and 2009f), ECB calculations.
Note: For Italy, the ﬁ  scal stimulus data reﬂ  ect the net impact of the measures taken in response to the crisis.
1) A positive sign indicates an expansionary ﬁ  scal position, i.e. a deterioration of the respective ﬁ  scal balance.
Chart 3 Composition of fiscal stimulus 
measures in the euro area (2009-10)












Sources: European Commission (2009d), ECB calculations.26
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and support for housing or property markets. 
In terms of the budgetary impact, this category 
alone accounts for half of the total stimulus by 
euro area countries in 2009-10 (0.9% of GDP). 
More than half of the countries have adopted 
sizeable stimulus measures in the area of public 
investment, such as investment in infrastructure, 
as well as other public investment aimed at 
supporting green industries, and/or improving 
energy efﬁ  ciency. This category comes second 
in terms of budgetary impact in 2009-10, with 
about 28% of the total stimulus. Similarly, about 
half of the countries have also implemented 
sizeable measures to support business, such 
as the reduction of taxes and social security 
contributions, and direct aid in the form of earlier 
payment of VAT returns, providing subsidies and 
stepping up export promotion (17% of the total 
stimulus). Signiﬁ   cantly increased spending on 
labour market measures, such as wage subsidies 
and active labour market policies, have initially 
been adopted by only a few countries and 
account for only 5% of the total stimulus volume. 
One should note that many countries also 
supported demand through extra-budgetary 
actions which do not directly affect their 
government budgets, such as capital injections, 
loans and guarantees to non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms and 
extra investment by public corporations. The total 
size of these additional measures is estimated 
at 0.5% of GDP for the euro area in 2009-10. 
Finally, at the EU level, EU and EIB budgets 
were used to respectively accelerate the payment 
of structural funds and give ﬁ  nancial support to 
small and medium-size ﬁ  rms.  
According to the European Commission 
(2009b and 2009d), the stimulus measures were 
generally implemented in a timely fashion, 
although one may note that new public 
investment projects (other than maintenance or 
frontloading existing plans), as well as various 
tax cuts, were subject to implementation lags 
and took quite some time to become effective. 
The stimuli are also considered to have been 
well targeted, at liquidity- or credit-constrained 
households and ﬁ  rms, or ailing sectors such as 
construction or the car industry in some 
countries. However, without a detailed cost/
beneﬁ  t analysis the economic efﬁ  ciency of this 
allocation is difﬁ   cult to assess.16 Moreover, 
government support to speciﬁ  c industrial sectors 
may distort competition within Europe and must 
therefore observe EU state aid rules. Clear 
doubts exist regarding the temporary character 
of the stimuli, especially for revenue measures, 
given that most of these were generally not 
designed to be phased out quickly and for 
political economy reasons could be difﬁ  cult 
to reverse. 
For an assessment of the economic impact of the vehicle- 16 
scrapping schemes, see ECB (2009e).  
Box 3
FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PAST SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES 1
This box aims to provide some stylised facts about the evolution of key ﬁ  scal variables during 
past systemic ﬁ  nancial crises in advanced economies. It tries to identify common features and 
differences between systemic crisis episodes, on the one hand, and normal cyclical downturns, 
on the other. In addition, it provides a comparison of the current and expected ﬁ  scal developments 
in the euro area with the past systemic crisis experience in advanced economies.2
1  Prepared by Vilém Valenta.
2  This box compares ﬁ  scal developments during “normal cycles”, calculated as the average development of a particular ﬁ  scal variable 
across past recession periods in 20 advanced economies, to so-called “crisis cycles”, which are the past recession periods connected to 
5 systemic ﬁ  nancial crises in advanced economies (Spain, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Japan). The shaded range of normal cycles 
is demarcated by the lower and upper quartiles. The charts include also current and expected ﬁ  scal developments in the euro area 
based on European Commission (2009f). The year T on the horizontal axes represents a trough of the real GDP growth cycle. For the 
past cycles, data are synchronised according to actual past troughs; for the current and expected ﬁ  scal developments in the euro area, 
the trough in real GDP is assumed to occur in 2009. For an analysis focusing on other macroeconomic variables, see ECB (2009f). 27
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Response of government revenue and expenditure 
The ratio of government revenue to GDP remains, on average, more or less stable during normal 
economic cycles (see Chart A), reﬂ  ecting a rather close link of government revenue to economic 
activity. In case of systemic crises, a downward shift in the level of the revenue-to-GDP ratio 
can be identiﬁ  ed. This can be attributed, for example, to adverse structural effects of the crisis on 
tax-rich components of GDP, the impact from bursting asset price bubbles, or counter-cyclical 
tax cuts. For the euro area, the revenue ratio is expected to show only a moderate decline.
Government expenditure reacts in general much less in line with cyclical developments than the 
revenue side of the budget. Nominal downward rigidity of expenditures such as public wages and 
pensions, the automatic increase in unemployment and other social beneﬁ  ts and/or intentional 
ﬁ  scal stimulation in economic downturns lead to increases in expenditure-to-GDP ratios during 
economic recessions and the increases are even more dramatic in crisis episodes (see Chart B). 
The government expenditure ratio for the euro area is expected to develop broadly in line with 
the pattern observed in advanced economies in systemic crises.
Consequences for government budget balances and debt 
Economic downturns have a clear negative impact on government budget balances, the 
deterioration being much more pronounced and protracted in case of systemic crises (see Chart C). 
This evidence is not surprising and well in line with the above-described developments in 
revenue and expenditure ratios.
The more interesting ﬁ   nding may be that, while cyclically adjusted balances in advanced 
economies show a relatively ﬂ  at development in normal cycles, implying an a-cyclical or mildly 
counter-cyclical conduct of discretionary ﬁ  scal policies, there appears to be a stronger adverse 
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structural impact during systemic crises (see Chart D) 3. This may be attributable to ﬁ  scal activism 
to cushion the downturn, a slowdown of potential growth as a consequence of the systemic 
crisis which contributes to revenue shortfalls and higher spending ratios, and to some extent to 
increased debt servicing costs due to the signiﬁ  cant accumulation of debt.
Current developments in ﬁ  scal balances in the euro area follow a pattern typical for systemic 
crises, i.e. a deep structural deterioration, which is expected to persist under unchanged policies. 
It is notable that the selected advanced countries 
hit by such crises in the past had however 
started from favourable ﬁ  scal positions. In this 
respect, the euro area was less well prepared 
for the current systemic crisis.
As shown in Chart E, systemic crises led, 
on average, to much higher increases in 
gross government debt-to-GDP ratios than 
in average business cycles in the past. This 
can be explained by a more pronounced and 
protracted deterioration in public ﬁ  nances, 
as well as the ﬁ  scal costs related to ﬁ  nancial 
crises. 
The current steep increase in the euro area 
government debt ratio is well in line with past 
ﬁ   nancial crises. Some euro area countries, 
in particular the Benelux countries, are at 
present even more severely affected and the 
expected rise in their government debt-to-GDP 
3  Inaccuracies and uncertainties connected with various methods of cyclical adjustment should be borne in mind, however, when 
considering these conclusions. 
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Chart E Government gross debt-to-GDP ratio 
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3.3  EFFECTIVENESS OF A FISCAL IMPULSE  
In the debate on the ﬁ   scal policy response 
to the economic downturn, the effectiveness 
of a ﬁ   scal impulse to support the economy, 
both through automatic stabilisers and ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures, has gained importance. This 
section reviews the literature on this point and 
also addresses the appropriate design of ﬁ  scal 
stimulus packages to maximise their impact.
AUTOMATIC STABILISATION
The working of automatic stabilisers provides 
the ﬁ  rst line of defence in an economic downturn 
and the need for discretionary ﬁ  scal measures 
has to be weighed against the built-in counter-
cyclical ﬁ  scal response from tax and spending 
systems.17 The advantages of allowing automatic 
stabilisers to operate are well known. They are 
not subject to implementation time lags in 
contrast with discretionary ﬁ  scal  policy. 
Moreover, they are not subject to political 
decision-making processes and their economic 
impact adjusts automatically to the cycle. Given 
the size of the public sector, their stabilising 
impact on the economy is relatively large in the 
euro area. Girouard and André (2005), as well 
as Deroose et al. (2008), estimate the elasticity 
of the total government budget balance with 
respect to the output gap for the euro area at 
about 0.49, compared with 0.33 for the 
United States.
On the other hand, while a larger public sector 
is associated with larger automatic stabilisers 
and lower cyclical output volatility, the 
correspondingly higher taxes lead to higher 
efﬁ  ciency costs with negative implications for 
potential output. Debrun et al. (2008) argue 
that the beneﬁ   ts from automatic stabilisers 
tend to decline when public expenditure 
approaches 40% of GDP. As also pointed out 
by Baunsgaard and Symansky (2009), bigger 
governments do not always provide increased 
economic stabilisation.18 Moreover, the impact 
of automatic stabilisers may have to be capped 
if the initial ﬁ  scal position was weak and due 
to strong cyclical factors the deﬁ  cit threatens 
to exceed prudent budget limits, which itself 
could become a source of instability. This 
asymmetry in the scope for an unconstrained 
operation of automatic stabilisers may be 
strongest when extreme negative events occur, 
Among OECD countries, the size of ﬁ  scal stimulus packages  17 
for 2008-10 varies inversely with the strength of automatic 
stabilisers (see OECD, 2009a). 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) offer a broad overview of the link  18 
between government spending trends and output growth. 
ratios is comparable to the crises in the Nordic 
countries in the early 1990s (see Chart F).
Caveats
Finally, certain caveats to the approach applied 
should be stressed. The comparisons of 
proﬁ  les for ﬁ  scal variables presented here are 
highly aggregated. As the analysis averages 
across countries, time, policy regimes and 
circumstances, on occasion some heterogeneity 
displayed by individual economies during 
systemic  ﬁ   nancial crises may be missed. 
In particular, the initial vulnerabilities and the 
causes of the crises differed, as did the policy 
responses, and these experiences are averaged 
out in discussing the “typical” path of ﬁ  scal 
variables following a ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Chart F Government gross debt-to-GDP ratio
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such as a housing market collapse (Blix, 2009). 
Furthermore, there is great uncertainty about 
the measurement of output gaps and thus the 
identiﬁ  cation of automatic stabilisers and their 
economic impact.19 This also argues for caution 
in allowing automatic stabilisers to work without 
restrictions.
DISCRETIONARY FISCAL POLICIES
Discretionary  ﬁ   scal policies attempting to 
stabilise the economy can in principle be 
successful if particular criteria are fulﬁ  lled. 
However, the size of the effect on demand 
and output tends to vary depending on several 
factors and is subject to great controversy.20 
Moreover, past experiences suggest that unless 
a discretionary ﬁ  scal stimulus is timely, targeted 
and temporary it actually risks being harmful.21 
Regarding  timeliness,  ﬁ   scal policy is 
characterised by long lags regarding the 
design, decisions on and implementation of 
measures, as highlighted by Blinder (2004). 
Therefore, under economic uncertainty, when 
the discretionary ﬁ   scal impulse reaches the 
economy, the measures taken may no longer be 
timely, and could instead become pro-cyclical. 
Indeed, there is some historical evidence for 
such pro-cyclicality, notably in euro area 
countries (see OECD, 2003, and Turrini, 2008). 
Targeted discretionary ﬁ   scal policy may also 
prove difﬁ  cult to carry out, and the group of 
beneﬁ  ciaries can easily go beyond liquidity- or 
credit-constrained consumers, encompassing 
also non-rationed consumers that may save 
the stimulus. This reduces the effectiveness of 
the ﬁ  scal measure. Moreover, when allocating 
the funds, economic efﬁ  ciency  considerations 
should also play a role, for example, to avoid 
that the structural adjustment of declining 
industries is prevented. 
The temporary character of a discretionary ﬁ  scal 
stimulus should also be ensured. Still, there is a 
risk that tax cuts or spending increases that are 
intended to be temporary will in practice become 
permanent and not be reversed. A more 
permanent ﬁ  scal expansion would worsen ﬁ  scal 
imbalances, could imply higher domestic 
interest rates and may then crowd out private 
investment during the recovery phase.22 
Moreover, it could trigger concerns about ﬁ  scal 
sustainability, motivating households to save 
rather than spend the ﬁ  scal bonus. In this respect, 
Corsetti et al. (2009) show that the impact of a 
government spending increase on private 
consumption is positive when households expect 
this stimulus to be reversed through future 
government spending cuts.
One could also argue that coordination of ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures to counter an international 
economic recession would reduce cross-border 
leakages and thereby increases the effectiveness 
of a ﬁ   scal stimulus. The available empirical 
studies tend to ﬁ  nd that the cross-border effects 
of tax and government spending shocks are weak 
or insigniﬁ   cant in the euro area.23 Therefore, 
if the size of national ﬁ  scal multipliers is limited, 
the quantitative importance of a spill-over effect 
will also be small.24 Nevertheless, it could be 
signiﬁ  cant at the aggregate euro area level in the 
face of a common negative shock.
Even when discretionary stimulus packages are 
expected to comply with the criteria mentioned 
above, questions relating to their optimal 
design remain open to debate. Despite the great 
heterogeneity of results in the empirical literature 
See for instance ECB (2002, 2005) and Cimadomo (2008). 19 
See for example Hemming et al. (2002), ECB (2008a),  20 
IMF (2008a), Ilzetzki et al. (2009), and Bouthevillain et al. (2009). 
Fatás and Mihov (2003) study the reasons why ﬁ  scal policies  21 
frequently fail to meet these requirements and risk making 
matters worse. In the context of the 2008-09 global economic 
crisis, Spilimbergo et al. (2008) argue that the ﬁ  scal stimulus 
should be timely, large, lasting, diversiﬁ  ed, contingent, collective 
and sustainable, and that the challenge is to ﬁ  nd the right balance 
between these sometimes competing criteria. 
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009) provide evidence of such  22 
crowding-out effects on private investment for the OECD 
countries.
See Beetsma et al. (2006), Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo  23 
(2006), Gros and Hobza (2001), Marcellino (2006), Roeger and 
in’t Veld (2004). 
Regarding the ability of ﬁ  scal policies in EMU to contribute  24 
to cross-country output smoothing, which increases with the 
degree of business cycle synchronisation, see Afonso and 
Furceri (2008).31
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and the difﬁ  culty of making comparisons across 
various models and their assumptions, across 
countries, or across types of ﬁ  scal  measures, 
a few broad conclusions can be reached. 
First, in the short run, increases in government 
spending are likely to be more effective in 
supporting the economy than tax reductions, 
while tax cuts seem to work better in the longer 
run. Most empirical studies indicate that 
spending multipliers with respect to output are 
higher than tax multipliers in the short term, but 
their impact fades away in the medium to long 
run.25 This ﬁ  nding is consistent with the notion 
that part of the increase in disposable income 
resulting from a tax cut is likely to be saved 
(unless the tax cut fully targets credit-constrained 
consumers), while government purchases of 
goods and services directly affect aggregate 
demand and output.
Second, within each category, there are 
differences in effectiveness between various 
ﬁ   scal stimulus measures. Among government 
expenditure components, the largest short-term 
impact on demand appears to come from 
purchases of goods and services, while 
government investment is likely to have a 
higher impact in the medium to longer term. 
Higher social transfers usually have a quick 
positive impact if well targeted at liquidity- or 
credit-constrained households, but if persistent, 
they tend to be detrimental to long-term growth 
by creating distortions in the allocation of 
resources and impeding labour mobility.26 As 
regards tax components, work by Johansson et 
al. (2008) suggests that the effectiveness of tax 
changes depends on the existing tax structure and 
the proportion of credit-constrained agents, with 
wide differences across countries. In most cases, 
a reduction in income taxes appears to produce 
the strongest long-term impact on output.
Third, an economy’s response to various ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures is likely to depend on a range 
of other factors, such as its size and openness, the 
reaction of monetary policy, as well as institutional 
factors. In general, the responsiveness of output 
to a ﬁ  scal stimulus tends to be more noticeable in 
a large economy than in a small, open economy. 
This may be explained by the fact that, the 
more open the economy, the higher the share 
of additional consumption demand resulting 
from a ﬁ  scal stimulus that is going into imports. 
Reﬂ  ecting this consideration, by type of ﬁ  scal 
policy tool, IMF (2008b) simulations ﬁ  nd that the 
highest relative difference in the output response 
between a large economy and a small open 
economy is in the case of consumption tax cuts 
and increases in transfers. The monetary policy 
reaction plays a key role in the effectiveness 
of a ﬁ  scal stimulus, the output response being 
considerably higher and more persistent in the 
case of monetary accommodation. By type of 
ﬁ   scal tool, IMF (2008b) simulations shows 
that the output response to labour tax cuts is 
less affected by monetary accommodation in 
comparison with other tools (e.g. government 
investment, consumption taxes or transfers), 
due to the impact on labour supply. Institutional 
factors are also of importance in the design 
of a ﬁ   scal stimulus plan. How tax reductions, 
e.g. labour income tax cuts, affect output depends 
on labour market institutions, such as the degree 
of unionisation and features of the wage-setting 
process. Other factors, such as the preparedness of 
government institutions (efﬁ  ciency of spending/
line ministries versus tax collection agencies, the 
capacity of government agencies to implement 
large-scale investment programmes, etc.) also 
inﬂ  uence the effectiveness of spending versus tax 
measures.
RICARDIAN BEHAVIOUR
Ricardian equivalence may arise with 
forward-looking consumers (e.g. reﬂ  ecting 
intergenerational altruism within households) 
who save the proceeds from a debt-ﬁ  nanced ﬁ  scal 
stimulus in anticipation of the future tax increase 
that will be needed to repay the extra government 
debt. Therefore, consumers’ net wealth would be 
invariant in the case of a debt-ﬁ  nanced 
government expenditure increase, and budget 
See Hemming et al. (2002) for a general review. See Roeger and  25 
in’t Veld (2004), Al-Eyd and Barrell (2005), Hunt and Laxton 
(2003) and Perotti (2002) for studies on the euro area and large 
EU economies.
See Obstfeld and Peri (1998) and Checherita et al. (2009). 26 32
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deﬁ  cits would have no short-term real economic 
effects, contrary to the conventional Keynesian 
view that higher budget deﬁ  cits stimulate demand 
in the short run.27 The theoretical possibility of 
Ricardian equivalence is based on a number of 
strict assumptions, which are unlikely to hold in 
practice. Those assumptions include inﬁ  nitely 
living households, price ﬂ  exibility,  lump-sum 
taxes, efﬁ  cient capital markets and the absence of 
credit constraints.28 
Empirical evidence regarding Ricardian 
equivalence is mixed. Some studies for OECD 
countries on the direct link between the ﬁ  scal 
stance and private consumption have found a 
Ricardian offset of 50% or more, i.e. half of the 
ﬁ  scal impulse is saved, and an even higher share 
when it is perceived as permanent.29 Looking 
more broadly at the impact of discretionary 
ﬁ   scal impulses on real GDP growth in 
recessions, the IMF (2008b) ﬁ   nds only very 
small positive effects for industrial countries. In 
particular, such positive effects are contingent 
on low government debt levels (relative to the 
sample average) at the start of the ﬁ  scal impulse 
and they take several years to materialise. 
Additional evidence for the “old” EU15 group 
of countries shows that while extra government 
debt, being a component of consumers’ net 
wealth, has a signiﬁ  cant and positive coefﬁ  cient 
with regard to private consumption, this impact 
declines with the size of the government debt 
increase: if the debt increase exceeds a certain 
threshold (estimated at 5% of GDP), consumers 
increasingly see government indebtedness as 
a future problem rather than attributing any 
possible net wealth characteristics to it.30 
Empirical studies on the linkages between 
public and private saving, notably via external 
balances, can provide further insights regarding 
Ricardian behaviour. The argument is that when 
the government increases its consumption or 
reduces taxes, and Ricardian consumers just save 
more to prepare for the higher future tax burden, 
national savings remain broadly constant and 
thus the current account balance stays largely 
unaffected. For the EU and OECD countries 
there is indeed no strong evidence pointing to a 
direct and close relationship between government 
budget balances and current account balances.31 
Other studies indicate that only beyond certain 
government debt thresholds (i.e. 80% of GDP) 
the behaviour of private agents in euro area 
countries becomes more Ricardian. This points 
to a possible variability in the share of Ricardian 
consumers across countries and across time.32 
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS IN DSGE MODELS
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models are used widely within international 
institutions and are useful tools for analysing 
the effectiveness of ﬁ   scal stimulus packages. 
The introduction of non-Ricardian households 
into DSGE models is devised to allow, inter 
alia, for the possibility of crowding-in effects 
of government spending shocks, i.e. ﬁ  scal 
multipliers larger than one, reﬂ  ecting the fact 
that non-Ricardian households tend to have a 
higher propensity to consume out of disposable 
income than households showing Ricardian 
behaviour. To the extent that non-Ricardian 
households are typically assumed to be liquidity- 
or credit-constrained, this would support also 
the existence of a link between credit market 
conditions and ﬁ  scal policy effectiveness. 
Looking at the literature, the share of 
non-Ricardian households for the euro area is 
mostly in a range of 25-35%,33 whereas it is 
35-50% for the United States.34 By and large, 
the share of non-Ricardian households thus 
See Ricardo (1817) and Barro (1974). 27 
See also Buiter (1985) and Seater (1993).  28 
See Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2008).  29 
See Afonso (2008a and 2008b) on Ricardian behaviour. 30 
See Afonso and Rault (2008), on the basis of panel cointegration  31 
and SUR analysis.
See Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008). 32 
For the euro area, Coenen and Straub (2005) report an estimate  33 
of 25% for the share of non-Ricardian consumers in a version of 
the Smets and Wouters (2003) model that was estimated using 
Bayesian techniques. By contrast, a somewhat higher estimated 
share of 35% for non-Ricardian consumers in the euro area 
is reported by Ratto et al. (2009) for the QUEST III model of 
the European Commission. Forni et al. (2009) also report 35% 
for the share of non-Ricardian consumers for a euro area-wide 
DSGE model developed at the Banca d’Italia. On the other hand, 
Roeger and in’t Veld (2009) assume a share of credit-constrained 
households of 30% in addition to a share of liquidity-constrained 
households of 30% in the EU. The unconstrained (Ricardian) 
households thus represent 40% only.33
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tends to be about 10-15 percentage points 
lower in models for the euro area economy 
compared with models for the US economy. 
Overall, this supports the widely held view of 
a higher sensitivity of private saving to ﬁ  scal 
expansions (or consolidations) in the euro area. 
However, given that the shares of non-Ricardian 
and Ricardian households are most likely state-
dependent (e.g. inﬂ  uenced by the ﬁ  nancial and 
economic crisis or higher government debt 
ratios), these ﬁ   gures need to be interpreted 
cautiously. In particular, one could argue that 
the share of liquidity- or credit-constrained 
(i.e. non-Ricardian) households may be larger 
in a crisis, situation than in normal times, which 
could then increase the effectiveness of the 
ﬁ  scal stimulus measures. On the other hand, in a 
crisis, more consumers may be concerned about 
a strong rise in government debt, especially 
if certain debt thresholds are exceeded. This 
would actually result in the opposite effect, 
i.e. the share of non-Ricardian households 
may become smaller. In addition, the possible 
negative reaction of ﬁ  nancial markets to higher 
government indebtedness may raise interest rates 
and undermine the expected positive economic 
effect from a ﬁ  scal stimulus. 
Coenen et al. (2010) compare the effectiveness 
of  ﬁ   scal stimulus measures in various DSGE 
models used by international institutions  35 
including the calibrated version of the 
ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM).36 
The following set of results emerges across 
DSGE models. The ﬁ   scal multiplier is larger 
1) if monetary policy accommodates the 
stimulus and if in that case prices are more 
ﬂ  exible; 2) if the stimulus is temporary rather 
than permanent; 3) in closed economies (unless 
international coordination occurs); 4) if the 
composition is right (i.e. the multiplier is larger 
for direct government expenditures than for 
taxes and larger for targeted transfers than for 
general transfers); and 5) if the share of 
liquidity- and credit-constrained (non-Ricardian) 
consumers is larger. Taken together, in line with 
the ﬁ  ndings of Ilzetzki et al. (2009), the impact 
of discretionary ﬁ  scal policies on output and the 
size of ﬁ   scal multipliers is very much 
state-dependent. 
For the calibrated version of the ECB’s NAWM 
and under the assumption of monetary policy 
accommodation, the ﬁ  rst-year  ﬁ  scal  multiplier 
with respect to output is 1.2 for government 
consumption, 1.1 for government investment, 
0.3 for government transfers to all households, 
0.1 for labour taxes and 0.4 for consumption 
taxes.37 A sensitivity analysis reveals that 
doubling the share of non-Ricardian consumers 
from 25% to 50% increases the effect on real GDP 
only to a comparatively small extent. By contrast, 
a moderately higher risk premium on government 
bond yields, in response to deteriorating ﬁ  scal 
positions, signiﬁ  cantly reduces the impact. These 
ﬁ  scal multipliers with respect to output are similar 
to the results for the New Keynesian models with 
rational expectations formation examined by 
Cwik and Wieland (2009) for the euro area. 
However, it should be stressed that the 
uncertainty concerning the size of the ﬁ  scal 
multiplier is large, notably in times of ﬁ  nancial 
crisis going along with a sharp recession and 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) econometrically estimate the share  34 
of non-Ricardian households to be 50% in the United States using 
macroeconomic time-series evidence. More recently, Iacoviello 
(2005) studies the housing market in a DSGE framework and 
reports a somewhat lower econometrically estimated share of 
US non-Ricardian consumers of 35%. On the other hand, Galí 
et al. (2007) assume the share to be 50% using macroeconomic 
time-series evidence to calibrate a DSGE model which 
focuses on the effects of government consumption on private 
consumption. Moreover, Erceg et al. (2006) calibrate the share of 
US non-Ricardian households to 50% in the SIGMA model, 
which is a DSGE model used at the Federal Reserve Board.
The following international institutions participated in the  35 
comparison exercise: European Commission (QUEST III model), 
International Monetary Fund (GIMF model), European 
Central Bank (NAWM model), Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (SIGMA model and FRB US model), 
OECD (OECD ﬁ   scal model) and the Bank of Canada 
(BoC-GEM model).
See Coenen et al. (2008) and Straub and Tchakarov (2007). 36 
The size of the ﬁ  scal measures corresponds to 1% of baseline  37 
GDP. The ﬁ  scal stimulus measures are assumed to be temporary, 
i.e. to last for two years and are zero thereafter. In the analysis, 
the ﬁ  scal and monetary policies reaction functions are assumed 
to be inactive over the two-year implementation horizon of the 
ﬁ  scal measures, but are allowed to become active thereafter.34
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deﬂ  ationary risks. In particular, Christiano et al. 
(2009) and Erceg and Linde (2010) show that the 
multipliers in standard New Keynesian models 
for the United States can become very large if 
the economy is in a deep recession and the zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding 
for sufﬁ  ciently many periods, which is akin to 
implicit monetary policy accommodation. On 
the other hand, these authors show also that 
the ﬁ  scal multiplier decreases in case the ﬁ  scal 
stimulus is subject to implementation lags, 
because of anticipation effects and a larger 
initial deterioration of the government balance. 
Moreover, Erceg and Linde (2010) demonstrate 
that the ﬁ  scal multiplier falls substantially with 
the size of the ﬁ  scal stimulus if the economy 
is at the zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates initially.  
3.4   CONCLUSIONS 
Euro area governments have responded to the 
economic downturn by adopting sizeable ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures on top of a signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  scal 
impulse provided by automatic stabilisers, 
revenue shortfalls and structural spending 
growth. Fiscal developments in the euro area 
have so far been broadly similar to those 
observed during past systemic ﬁ  nancial crises in 
advanced economies, showing a large increase 
in government expenditure-to-GDP ratios, 
a considerable deterioration of government 
structural balances, and a rapid accumulation 
of government debt. However, in contrast to 
the advanced countries that have faced ﬁ  nancial 
crises in the past, the euro area began from a less 
favourable (structural) ﬁ  scal starting position.
In the face of an economic downturn, automatic 
ﬁ   scal stabilisers should be the ﬁ   rst line of 
defence, although they may be subject to 
decreasing returns the more ﬁ  scal  stability 
itself is endangered. As their sensitivity to the 
business cycle is rather high in the euro area, 
this requires a sound initial ﬁ  scal position, a key 
condition which was not fulﬁ  lled for many euro 
area countries. Additional counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal 
measures should only be considered when it can 
be ensured that they will be timely, targeted and 
temporary. As regards the “optimal” composition 
of a ﬁ   scal stimulus package in terms of its 
impact on the economy, the literature suggests 
taking into account several factors, such as: 
(i) the initial ﬁ   scal position and the existing 
tax and expenditure structures; (ii) the 
expected depth and duration of the economic 
downturn, and correspondingly, the potential 
trade-off between short-term stabilisation 
objectives (demand side) and longer-term 
growth-enhancing tools (supply side); 
(iii) the expected size of the ﬁ  scal multipliers 
of various instruments and the time needed for 
the measures to feed through to demand and 
output; (iv) the institutional characteristics that 
facilitate implementation; and (v) the need to 
minimise distortions in market mechanisms. 
With respect to the size of ﬁ  scal  multipliers, 
the empirical literature suggests that the impact 
of a ﬁ   scal stimulus on output is very much 
state-dependent. 
Overall, euro area countries would be well 
advised to ensure sound ﬁ   scal positions in 
normal times, so that in case of need the 
automatic stabilisers can be allowed to operate 
freely and fully, without exceeding the 3% of 
GDP reference value for government deﬁ  cits. 
Any  ﬁ   scal stimulus package in an economic 
recession should meet the above criteria for 
success and be designed in such a way that it 
stabilises the economy and at the same time 
supports a self-sustaining recovery.35
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Between the intensiﬁ   cation of the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis in September 2008 and the early signs of 
stabilisation in ﬁ  nancial markets in March 2009, 
government bond yields in the euro area reacted 
strongly. On the one hand, a “ﬂ  ight to safety” 
was observed which reduced the sovereign 
bond yields of most euro area countries. 
On the other hand, sovereign bond spreads 
relative to the German benchmark increased 
for all euro area countries, in particular for 
those whose ﬁ  scal situation was perceived as 
being most vulnerable. This parallel “ﬂ  ight to 
quality” indicates that markets also tended to 
discriminate more clearly between euro area 
countries based on their perceived sovereign 
default risks and creditworthiness. In addition, a 
greater preference among investors for the most 
liquid government bond markets contributed to 
some dispersion in sovereign bond yields. 
This chapter analyses the reaction of ﬁ  nancial 
markets to ﬁ   scal policy developments in the 
euro area countries in the context of the crisis. 
Section 4.2 presents stylised facts on the ﬁ  nancial 
market reaction, focusing on government bond 
yields and sovereign credit default swap (CDS) 
premia between July 2007, when the ﬁ  rst signs 
of increasing turmoil in global ﬁ  nancial markets 
became visible, and September 2009. Section 4.3 
discusses the ﬁ  ndings of the academic literature 
with respect to the determinants of sovereign 
bond yield spreads; it also summarises the 
results of an analytical investigation of the 
factors underlying the rise in government bond 
spreads over Germany in the euro area countries 
during the critical period from July 2007 to 
March 2009. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2  THE FINANCIAL MARKET REACTION 
FROM JULY 2007 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 2009 
As the crisis intensiﬁ  ed,  ﬁ  nancial  markets 
reacted strongly. A ﬂ  ight to safety caused many 
investors to move away from more risky private 
ﬁ  nancial assets (in particular equity and lower-
rated corporate bonds) into safer government 
paper. The resulting increase in the demand for 
government bonds led to a reduction in sovereign 
bond yields for most euro area countries, 
especially for bonds at shorter maturities, to 
which also the relaxation of monetary policy 
contributed. At the same time, the government 
interventions in support of the banking sector 
helped to contain the rise in credit default 
spreads for ﬁ   nancial corporations in the euro 
area. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the price of this 
success is that the governments have assumed 
substantial ﬁ  scal costs and credit risks, on top 
of the budgetary impact from the economic 
downturn and the ﬁ  scal stimulus measures.
This risk transfer from the private to the public 
sector is also revealed by the developments 
in CDS premia: between end-September and 
end-October 2008, when many governments 
across the euro area announced substantial 
bank rescue packages, sovereign CDS premia 
for all euro area countries increased sharply, 
whereas the CDS premia for European ﬁ  nancial 
corporations – i.e. those covered by the iTraxx 
ﬁ  nancials  index  39 – started to decline. This 
is illustrated in Chart 4 (upper panel), which 
depicts the cumulative changes between 
mid-September 2008 (when the US investment 
bank Lehman Brothers collapsed) and 
end-March 2009 (when ﬁ  nancial markets showed 
early signs of stabilisation) of average ﬁ  ve-year 
sovereign CDS premia for euro area countries and 
CDS premia for European ﬁ  nancial institutions 
covered by the iTraxx index. The vertical bars 
denote the dates on which bank rescue packages 
were announced. The chart shows that at the 
time of announcement of the bailout packages, 
Prepared by Maria Grazia Attinasi, Cristina Checherita and  38 
Christiane Nickel. 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract in which a “protection  39 
buyer” pays a periodic premium to a “protection seller” and, in 
exchange, receives a pay-off if the reference entity (a ﬁ  rm or a 
government issuer) experiences a “credit event”, for example, a 
failure to make scheduled interest or redemption payments on debt 
instruments (typically bonds or loans). The iTraxx ﬁ  nancial index 
contains the CDS spreads of 25 European ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
including institutions from the United Kingdom and Switzerland.36
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sovereign CDS premia increased, whereas 
CDS premia for ﬁ  nancial institutions declined. 
This suggests that the broad-based rescue 
packages have alleviated some credit risk in the 
banking sector and brought about an immediate 
transfer of credit risk from the ﬁ  nancial to the 
public sector (see also Ejsing and Lemke, 
2009). 
While all euro area countries faced a rise in 
sovereign CDS premia until end-March 2009, 
some countries were affected more than 
others (see lower panel of Chart 4). These 
cross-country differences were also mirrored 
by the trend in government bond yields relative 
to Germany. Chart 5 depicts the developments 
in ten-year sovereign bond yields for most 
euro area governments from January 2007 up 
to September 2009. Before the intensiﬁ  cation 
of the ﬁ   nancial turmoil in September 2008, 
government bond yields moved quite closely 
together. Between then and end-March 2009, 
developments differed across countries to a 
great extent. 
By the fourth quarter of 2008, the budgetary 
outlook across euro area countries had worsened 
rapidly. In this crisis episode of high uncertainty 
and market turbulence, this may have caused 
investors to discriminate more strongly among 
sovereign borrowers by asking for higher risk 
premia from countries perceived to be especially 
vulnerable. Chart 6 provides stylised evidence 
for this argument. The ten-year government bond 
yield spreads over Germany for the euro area 
countries under consideration are plotted against 
their expected budget balance as a percentage 
of GDP relative to that of Germany. The chart 
shows that countries that were expected to have 
a less favourable budget balance outlook than 
Germany experienced larger sovereign bond yield 
differentials over the period from end-July 2007 
to end-March 2009. France was an outlier in this 
respect, as it experienced only a slight increase 
in its ten-year government bond yield differential 
against Germany despite its less favourable 
expected budget balance. This can possibly 
be explained by the relatively lower liquidity 
premium which France may face compared with 
the other countries under consideration. 
Between March 2009 and September 2009, 
ﬁ  nancial market conditions started to normalise, 
investors’ regained conﬁ   dence and yields 
Chart 4 Sovereign CDS premia for the euro 
area and CDS premia for European financial 
institutions
(15 September 2008-31 March 2009; basis points)
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Sources: Datastream and ECB calculations.
Note: The vertical bars indicate the dates on which bank rescue 
packages were announced in euro area countries.37
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returned to more normal levels. Euro area 
long-term sovereign bond spreads vis-à-vis 
Germany have tightened somewhat. A similar 
trend can be observed for sovereign CDS premia 
for all euro area countries. 
Nevertheless, Chart 5 also shows the volatile 
pattern and the country variation of ten-year 
government bond yields during this period. 
By September 2009 in all euro area countries, 
except Greece and Ireland, ten-year government 
bond yields were lower than before the crisis. 
Furthermore, whereas for the majority of 
countries the upward pressures on long-term 
bond yields subsided once the ﬁ  nancial  and 
economic conditions stabilised, for some other 
countries more recent developments in sovereign 
bond yields suggest that these countries may 
end up paying a permanently higher premium 
after the crisis. 
Looking at the development of yields at various 
maturities, Chart 7 depicts the change in the 
level of sovereign bond yields for maturities 
of one, two, ﬁ   ve and ten years, divided into 
two periods: the left panel compares the bond 
yields in January 2007 with the bond yields 
at their height in March 2009, while the right 
panel depicts the change in bond yields between 
March 2009 and September 2009. The left panel 
Chart 6 Ten-year government bond yield spreads 
of euro area countries over Germany and the 
expected budget balance relative to Germany
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Sources: Bloomberg, European Commission and ECB calculations.
Note: For each country, the average expected budget balance for 
2007, 2008 and 2009 is computed using vintages of the European 
Commission forecasts available at each point in time.
Chart 5 Ten-year government bond yields of euro area countries




























Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.
Note: Some euro area countries are not shown because of a lack of data.38
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shows that for most countries and across the 
maturity spectrum bond spreads on balance have 
come down from January 2007 to March 2009. 
However, there are some noteworthy exceptions. 
For Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria and 
Spain, the yield at the ten-year maturity actually 
increased, mainly related to the effects of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis and the higher differentiation of 
country risks by ﬁ  nancial markets, as described 
above. For Ireland and Greece, the bond yields 
even increased at shorter maturities. After 
March 2009, bond yields came down across the 
maturity spectrum and for almost all countries 
(with the exception of Germany, where a small 
increase was recorded for the ﬁ  ve- and ten-year 
maturity). Overall, by September 2009, only 
Ireland and Greece had witnessed higher 
ten-year sovereign bond yields in comparison to 
January 2007.40  
The generalised decline in short-term bond 
yields is partly related to the reduction in 
monetary policy rates combined with the 
enhanced credit support measures. Furthermore, 
the deterioration in investors’ appetite for riskier 
private ﬁ  nancial assets may have supported the 
demand for low-yielding but safer government 
assets of all maturities, particularly the 
short-term ones. In such a reassessment of 
This can be seen if one combines the two graphs in Chart 7.   40 
Chart 7 Changes in euro area government bond yields
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Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.
Table 5 Long-term foreign-currency sovereign rating downgrades in 2009
Country Rating in 2007 Date of downgrade Rating lowered to Outlook












Spain   AAA  19 January 2009 AA+ Stable
Portugal  AA-  21 January 2009 A+   Stable
Source: Standard and Poor’s.39
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risk, investors seem to have taken into account 
cross-country differences in creditworthiness 
and bond market liquidity.
Against the backdrop of lower interest rates, most 
euro area governments have been able to ﬁ  nance 
their substantial new debt issuance in the context 
of the crisis under relatively favourable market 
conditions. This success was also due to tactical 
adjustments in debt management strategies to 
ensure the attractiveness of government debt 
issues. Looking ahead, as the economy recovers 
and competition for ﬁ  nancing  increases, 
governments may face higher medium- and 
long-term bond yields again. Yields at shorter 
maturities may be expected to increase once 
monetary policy exits the expansionary stance.
Directly impacting on the developments in 
sovereign bond markets, some euro area 
countries have experienced downgrades in 
their credit ratings (see Table 5), reﬂ  ecting 
deteriorating  ﬁ   scal prospects, especially the 
strong projected rise in government debt ratios 
and signiﬁ   cant off-balance-sheet contingent 
liabilities. Greece, for example, since the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2009 has experienced downgrades 
of its sovereign credit rating, due to increasing 
concerns about the sustainability of the country’s 
public  ﬁ   nances and uncertainty regarding the 
quality of its statistical data and forecasts. 
4.3  THE DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT BOND 
YIELD SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA 
This section aims at exploring potential 
determinants of long-term government bond 
yield spreads in the euro area during the 
crisis period. It ﬁ  rst discusses the ﬁ  ndings of 
the academic literature on the determinants 
of sovereign bond yield spreads. Box 4 
then summarises the results of an empirical 
investigation of the factors underlying the initial 
rise in government bond spreads over Germany 
in the euro area countries.
As discussed in the academic literature, long-
term government bond yield spreads are 
likely to depend on factors such as investors’ 
perceptions of countries’ credit risk (as captured, 
in particular, by the relative soundness of 
expected ﬁ  scal positions or other indicators of 
creditworthiness), market liquidity risk (which 
may be related to the relative size of sovereign 
bond markets), and the degree of international 
risk aversion on the part of investors (investor 
sentiment towards this asset class compared 
with others, e.g. corporate bonds). Finally, and 
related to the creditworthiness of countries, 
the effect of announcements, for example, 
macroeconomic news/surprises or ﬁ  scal policy 
events (e.g. government plans) might also play 
a role in the developments in sovereign bond 
spreads. 
As regards credit risk, for European and, in 
particular, euro area countries, several studies 
tend to point towards a signiﬁ   cant impact of 
ﬁ   scal fundamentals (government debt and/or 
deﬁ  cits) in explaining sovereign bond spreads.41 
More recently, evidence for the role of ﬁ  scal 
factors across euro area countries has been 
unveiled also for the period of the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. In particular, Haugh et al. (2009) ﬁ  nd 
evidence of non-linear effects of ﬁ  scal variables 
(including the expected deﬁ  cit and the ratio of 
debt service payments to tax receipts; also in 
interaction with international risk aversion) 
which could help to explain sovereign bond 
spreads. Sgherri and Zoli (2009) ﬁ  nd  that 
ﬁ   nancial markets’ responsiveness to future 
sovereign debt dynamics and to ﬁ  scal  risks 
related to national ﬁ  nancial  sectors’ 
vulnerabilities increased progressively since 
October 2008. On the other hand, Heppke-Falk 
and Huefner (2004) ﬁ   nd no evidence that 
expected budget deﬁ  cits (derived from consensus 
forecasts) had an impact on interest rate swap 
spreads in France, Germany and Italy over the 
period 1994-2004. However, they ﬁ  nd  that 
market discipline (markets’ sensitivity to public 
ﬁ   nances) increased in Germany and France 
(but not in Italy) since July 1997 (after the 
Stability and Growth Pact had been signed), and 
in Germany also after the start of EMU in 1999. 
See Faini (2006), Bernoth et al. (2004), Hallerberg and Wolff  41 
(2006), Codogno et al. (2003) and Bernoth and Wolff (2008).40
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As regards the liquidity risk premium, the 
literature does not provide clear evidence on 
its relative importance versus credit risk for 
sovereign bond markets. Several studies, such 
as Gomez-Puig (2006) and Beber et al. (2009), 
ﬁ  nd that liquidity risk is an important factor in 
explaining spreads after the introduction of the 
euro and the most important factor in times of 
heightened uncertainty.
With respect to other factors, Manganelli and 
Wolswijk (2009) ﬁ   nd that in the euro area, 
government bond spreads are largely driven 
by the monetary policy interest rate, which 
can be interpreted as a proxy for a common 
international risk factor, while credit risk and 
liquidity risk also matter in EMU. Codogno et al. 
(2003) also posit that international risk aversion 
is one of the main factors in explaining sovereign 
bond yield spreads in the euro area. The impact 
of international risk is found to be larger in 
countries with high government debt ratios. 
France is found to be the only country in which 
liquidity matters more than international risk. 
Event studies have shown that also 
announcements, for example of macroeconomic 
data, have a discernable impact on government 
bond spreads, especially over shorter-term 
horizons. The papers devoted to the euro area 
government bond markets ﬁ   nd that US data 
releases not only affect US markets, but also 
exert a signiﬁ   cant effect on European bond 
markets. In a dynamic model of intraday bond 
returns for long-term German government 
bonds, Andersson et al. (2006) use euro area, 
German, French and Italian macroeconomic data 
releases, in addition to US announcements, and 
ﬁ  nd  signiﬁ   cant effects on prices of long-term 
government bonds. Codogno et al. (2003) ﬁ  nd 
that announcements of the initiation of excessive 
deﬁ  cit procedures seem to have raised sovereign 
bond spreads for Portugal. By contrast, Afonso 
and Strauch (2007) show that there was no 
persistent and systematic reaction of the default 
risk premium to the identiﬁ  ed  ﬁ  scal  policy 
events during 2002, even if some speciﬁ  c events 
had a signiﬁ   cant, temporary impact on swap 
spreads.
To conclude, the review of the empirical 
literature on balance provides evidence that 
ﬁ  scal fundamentals are signiﬁ  cant in explaining 
sovereign bond spreads in normal economic 
times and even more so in crisis times. For 
the 2008-09 crisis, the empirical evidence 
summarised in Box 4 points to the same 
conclusion: euro area governments with more 
favourable expected ﬁ  scal positions may beneﬁ  t 
from lower borrowing costs in times of crisis. 
In addition, sound ﬁ   scal positions offer the 
“cushion” that enables governments to shoulder 
the additional ﬁ   scal costs arising from bank 
rescue operations and ﬁ  scal stimulus measures. 
As the 2008-09 crisis has shown, such measures 
contributed to averting a possible collapse of 
the ﬁ  nancial system and supporting short-term 
domestic demand.
Box 4
THE DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN BOND YIELD SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION 1
In an empirical model for the euro area during the ﬁ  nancial crisis period from 31 July 2007 to 
25 March 2009, Attinasi et al. (2009) propose that long-term government bond yield spreads 
(over Germany) are likely to depend on three categories of factors: (i) countries’ credit risk, as 
captured particularly by indicators of expected ﬁ  scal positions; (ii) markets’ liquidity risk; and 
(iii) the degree of international risk aversion. In addition, given the particular nature of the period 
1  Prepared by Maria Grazia Attinasi, Cristina Checherita and Christiane Nickel. 41
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of ﬁ  nancial crisis covered in the analysis, the announcements of bank rescue packages are also 
considered potentially relevant in explaining government bond spreads, and whether there has 
been a transfer of credit risk from the private ﬁ  nancial sector to the public sector.2
The following empirical model is used to explain ten-year government bond yield spreads of 
ten euro area countries 3 over Germany (spread):
spreadit = α + ρ spreadit – 1 + β1 (ANN)it + β2 FISCit + β3 IntlRiskt + β4 LIQit + εit
In this model, ANN denotes the announcements of bank rescue packages made by individual 
euro area governments (this variable takes the value 1 after the date of the announcement 
and the value 0 before); FISC denotes the expected general government budget balance and/
or gross debt as a share of GDP, relative to Germany, over the next two years, as released 
bi-annually by the European Commission; IntlRisk is a proxy for investors’ international risk 
aversion, as given by the difference between the ten-year AAA-rated corporate bond yield in the 
United States (US) and the US ten-year Treasury bond yield; LIQ is a proxy for the degree of 
liquidity of euro area governments’ bond markets, measured as the size of a government’s gross 
debt issuance relative to Germany;4 and εit is the unexplained residual. 
Based on a dynamic panel model (estimated using feasible generalised least squares, in the presence 
of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity across panels), using both daily and 
monthly data as a robustness check, the empirical analysis comes to the following conclusions:
First, higher expected budget balances and/or higher expected government debt relative to    –
Germany  is on average associated with higher government bond yield spreads vis-à-vis the 
German benchmark. Moreover, the expected budget balance is robust to various speciﬁ  cations 
(more so than the expected debt variable). This may suggest that in periods of heightened 
economic uncertainty, the expected ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit seems to have a larger impact on the movements 
in sovereign bond spreads than in more tranquil episodes. This ﬁ  nding also indicates that 
investors were most concerned with the short-term ﬁ  scal outlook and less convinced by public 
statements that governments were still committed to longer-term ﬁ  scal sustainability.
Second, the greater the degree of international risk aversion, the higher the sovereign bond    –
spreads in the euro area.
Third, the liquidity risk of euro area government bond markets, relative to Germany, is also    –
found to play a statistically signiﬁ  cant role in explaining government bond yield spreads in 
the euro area: spreads seem to be lower, the higher the degree of liquidity in the respective 
government bond market.
Fourth, turning to the announcements of bank rescue packages, the initial government decisions    –
to step in to support the ﬁ  nancial sector increased, on average, the perceived risk of government 
debt compared with Germany during the period of the analysis. This can be interpreted as a 
2 The  ﬁ  scal stimulus packages announced by euro area governments to boost aggregate demand were not considered. Their effect on the 
ﬁ  scal variables would already be captured by the expected budget deﬁ  cit and debt ratios. 
3  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
4  Alternatively, the variable “traded volumes of total government securities maturing after 9 to 11 years relative to Germany” was used, 
but it was found to have a weak or no signiﬁ  cance in the model.42
ECB
Occasional Paper No 109
April 2010
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of developments in euro area 
sovereign bond yields shows that different 
factors affect investors’ perceptions and that 
there are differences across both countries and 
maturities. One of the most important ﬁ  ndings 
is that during the period of heightened ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil, investors increasingly discriminated 
among countries on the basis of their perceived 
sovereign default risk and creditworthiness, 
which is determined, among other factors, by 
differences in ﬁ  scal fundamentals. 
Moreover, as shown by the results of an 
empirical investigation, the fact that ﬁ  scal 
variables (e.g. expected government debt and 
deﬁ  cits, government announcements of ﬁ  nancial 
transfer of credit risk from the private banking sector to the government (as conﬁ  rmed by 
a similar regression of the difference between sovereign CDS premia and CDS premia for 
iTraxx ﬁ  nancials over the same variables). 5
Fifth, the paper also investigates the impact of the announced size of bank rescue operations    –
on investors’ perception of euro area governments’ credit risk compared with Germany. 
The empirical results with the size of bank rescue packages were found to be less conclusive 
than when announcements were used. They turned out to be inﬂ  uenced by an extreme outlier 
for Ireland, for which the maximum cumulative size of guarantees to the banking sector stood 
much above 100% of GDP. This analysis points out that investors’ discrimination among 
sovereign borrowers might have been triggered by governments’ credible commitment to 
extend support to the banking sector and not signiﬁ  cantly so by the mere size of this support. 
Investors may have anticipated that governments would provide as much support as needed 
to shore up ailing banks regardless of the amounts explicitly announced in the ﬁ  rst place 
(i.e. signiﬁ  cant implicit government guarantees may be added to the explicit ones).
Finally, the paper quantiﬁ  es the relative contributions of the main explanatory variables to 
the change in government bond spreads for the period under analysis.6 For the whole panel, 
international risk aversion appears to have made the largest relative contribution (over half) in 
explaining the widening of spreads. Fiscal positions (expected deﬁ  cit and debt) and related ﬁ  scal 
factors (the announcement of ﬁ  nancial rescue packages) were found to explain about one-third 
of the widening of sovereign spreads. The contribution of the proxy for liquidity risk was found 
on average to explain about one-seventh of the rise in spreads. 
By country, the expected ﬁ  scal positions (budget balance and debt) make the largest contribution 
to explaining the rise in sovereign bond spreads in Finland, followed by Ireland, Greece and 
Italy. The announcements of bank rescue packages contributed most to explaining the sovereign 
spread change in the case of Austria, followed by Portugal, and (to a similar extent) Belgium, 
Spain and Ireland. The fact that the largest contribution of bank rescue packages was recorded 
for Austria may reﬂ  ect possible market concerns regarding future rescue operations given the 
country’s exposure to the banking sector in Central and Eastern Europe. This conjecture is also 
supported by the fact that Austria is the country for which international risk aversion seems to 
have played the largest role in explaining the rise in sovereign spreads compared with the other 
countries in the sample. As regards the liquidity premium, it is found to be, by far, the largest 
contributor to the developments in sovereign bond spreads in France. 
5  Excluding the proxy for liquidity in the government bond market, since CDS premia do not incorporate liquidity risk. The analysis 
using CDS premia includes Germany in addition to the ten euro area countries mentioned above. 
6  These contributions are considered as being the maximum since other uncontrolled explanatory factors may play some additional role.43
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rescue packages) account for about one-third 
of the movements in euro area sovereign 
spreads during the ﬁ  nancial crisis points to the 
importance of preserving the public’s trust in 
the soundness of public ﬁ  nances.  Otherwise, 
market expectations about a government’s 
ability to meet its future debt obligations are not 
well anchored. 
An important lesson from the ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
is that countries should consolidate during 
good economic times in order to build a “ﬁ  scal 
cushion” that provides sufﬁ   cient room for 
manoeuvre during an economic downturn or 
a crisis. Many euro area countries failed to do 
this and entered the crisis with high government 
deﬁ  cits and debt ratios, which limited the scope 
of their ﬁ   scal actions at a time when such 
scope was needed the most. Moreover, when 
announcing bank rescue operations and ﬁ  scal 
stimulus packages, a credible commitment to 
maintain longer-term ﬁ  scal sustainability could 
have limited the negative market reaction, 
as reﬂ   ected in sovereign CDS premia and 
government bond spreads. 
The general fall in government bond yields in 
the euro area compared with the pre-crisis period 
should not be interpreted as a “clean bill of 
health” for public ﬁ  nances. A number of special 
factors played a favourable role, such as the 
temporary ﬂ  ight to safety and exceptionally low 
monetary policy rates combined with enhanced 
credit support measures. As the experience 
during the 2008-09 crisis showed, the market’s 
assessment of sovereign default risk and 
creditworthiness can change quickly. Therefore, 
it is essential that governments make a strong and 
credible commitment to a path of consolidation 
back towards sound ﬁ  scal positions. This will 
preserve trust in the sustainability of public 
ﬁ   nances and through lower risk premia in 
interest rates will support both the recovery and 
long-term economic growth.44
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the risks to the 
sustainability of euro area public ﬁ  nances that 
are associated with the crisis. While there are 
several deﬁ  nitions of ﬁ  scal sustainability, it is 
generally understood as the ability of a 
government to service its debt obligations in the 
long term (see also Box 5).43 For many euro area 
countries this ability has been impaired by the 
adverse developments in the primary budget 
balance, a rising burden of net interest payments, 
lower long-term output growth and the need to 
ﬁ  nance large capital injections in support of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector. The threat to the solvency of 
governments is most clearly shown by the fact 
that their debt-to-GDP ratios are on a rising path 
and will continue rising if ﬁ  scal policies remain 
unchanged. As indicated in Chart 8, after having 
declined from roughly 73% of GDP in 1998 to a 
trough of 66% of GDP in 2007, the euro area 
government debt-to-GDP ratio increased to 
69.3% in 2008 and is projected to rise strongly 
to 88.2% in 2011. 
The surge in the euro area government debt 
ratio is a concern for various reasons. First, 
rising budget deﬁ  cits and debt may fuel inﬂ  ation 
expectations and place an additional burden on 
the ECB’s monetary policy for the euro area. 
Second, if large government (re)ﬁ  nancing needs 
drive up real interest rates, this may crowd out 
private demand in the recovery phase. Third, 
rising government debt and higher sovereign 
bond yields imply higher interest expenditure. 
This either has to be covered by higher taxes, 
which are detrimental to potential growth, or 
by imposing constraints on other government 
spending items, including those promoting 
longer-term growth (e.g. infrastructure or 
education).44 Such constraints will become even 
tighter in the absence of reforms addressing 
the rising budgetary costs of an ageing society. 
Fourth, as discussed in Chapter 4, investors 
are likely to discriminate increasingly against 
sovereign borrowers with higher (expected) 
debt levels relative to GDP, in particular in 
times of elevated risk aversion. The rise in 
government bond yields that these sovereign 
borrowers face may even spill over to other euro 
area countries. 
Against this background, Section 5.2 discusses 
the main risks to the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances in the euro area countries. Section 5.3 
analyses these risks by presenting various 
scenarios and a sensitivity analysis of how 
the government debt ratio may develop under 
different assumptions.45 Section 5.4 concludes. 
Prepared by Maria Grazia Attinasi, Nadine Leiner-Killinger and  42 
Michal Slavik.
See for example Giammarioli et al. (2007) for a more detailed  43 
exposition on the issue.
Chalk and Tanzi (2002) discuss six channels through which large  44 
public debt can have a negative impact on growth.
For a similar analysis for the G20 countries, see IMF (2009b). 45 
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government support to banks
debt ratio w/o fiscal measures related to financial crisis
Sources: European Commission (2009f), European System of 
Central Banks, ECB calculations.
Notes: The years 2009-11 are projections. The ﬁ  scal impact of 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis on debt in 2008 and 2009 is captured by the 
government support to banks in the form of capital injections 
(i.e. loans and acquisition of shares), as well as asset purchases 
and other ﬁ  nancial transactions, including repayments. For 2010 
and 2011 the impact is kept constant at the 2009 level. See also 
Table 1 in Chapter 2.45
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Box 5
MEASURING FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY  1
The sustainability of public ﬁ  nances requires as a minimum that the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio is stable over time. This notwithstanding, in accordance with the Treaty and the Stability 
and Growth Pact, the general government gross debt ratio must be below the reference value of 
60% of GDP or “sufﬁ  ciently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace”, implying that in many euro area countries, debt ratios would need to be reduced 
substantially. From a theoretical perspective and for the purpose of deﬁ  ning ﬁ  scal sustainability, 
debt accumulation is driven by four main factors: (i) the government’s primary budget 
balance in each period, (ii) the interest payments on the outstanding stock of government debt, 
(iii) the nominal growth rate of the economy, which affects the debt-to-GDP ratio through a 
denominator effect and (iv) any stock-ﬂ  ow adjustments, i.e. those transactions or other factors 
that affect outstanding debt but do not affect the primary balance.
This can be formally expressed as:
  Δd =  dt – 1 − pt + sft
i − g
1 + g  (1)
where Δd is the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio over the previous period, i is the implicit interest 
rate paid on the outstanding government debt, g is the nominal growth rate of the economy, 
dt – 1 is the debt-to-GDP ratio in the previous period, pt is the primary balance-to-GDP ratio 
and sft presents the stock-ﬂ  ow adjustments-to-GDP ratio. The stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment includes 
differences in cash and accrual accounting, accumulation of ﬁ  nancial assets, valuation changes 
as well as other residual effects. This term has assumed particular relevance during the recent 
crisis in light of the ﬁ  nancial support provided by many euro area governments to ailing ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. As discussed in Chapter 2, this support generally has consisted of capital injections 
and acquisitions of (impaired) ﬁ  nancial assets. To the extent that these ﬁ  nancial transactions 
were conducted at market prices or yield a sufﬁ  cient return, they do not have an immediate 
impact on the primary balance, but will raise outstanding debt if governments need to borrow 
in order to ﬁ  nance them. The counterpart of this extra government debt is represented by the 
ﬁ  nancial assets that the governments acquired during the crisis, which in the future may be sold 
at a loss or a proﬁ  t. The explicit government guarantees that were provided in the context of 
the crisis represent contingent liabilities that are recorded off balance sheet. They would only 
affect the primary balance once a call on a guarantee is made, which will then usually result in a 
deﬁ  cit-increasing government capital transfer.2 The fees, dividends or interest payments that the 
government receives from the banks as a result of its rescue operations are recorded as revenues 
and improve the overall budget balance. As argued by the IMF (2009d), a comprehensive view 
of the sovereign balance sheet is necessary to properly assess the risks to the creditworthiness of 
governments following their crisis-related interventions.
Applying equation (1), the table on the next page displays the actual and projected developments in 
the euro area government debt-to-GDP ratios over the periods 2003-07 and 2008-11, respectively, 
as well as the underlying factors. As the table indicates, the euro area debt ratio is projected to 
rise to 88.2% of GDP in 2011. The main underlying factors are: (i) the change in the primary 
1  Prepared by Maria Grazia Attinasi, Nadine Leiner-Killinger and Michal Slavik.
2  For the statistical recording of government interventions to support the banking system, see Box 1 in Chapter 2.46
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5.2  RISKS TO FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
This section discusses the risks to ﬁ  scal 
sustainability associated with each of the 
main determinants of euro area government 
debt-to-GDP developments in relation to 
the crisis (see Box 5).
PRIMARY BALANCE
The primary balance is a major determinant 
of  ﬁ  scal  sustainability.46 The sharp and 
unexpectedly large deterioration in the euro area 
governments’ primary balances is illustrated in 
Chart 9. The chart plots the cumulated change 
over the period 2007-09 in the primary balances 
of euro area countries as was projected by the 
European Commission in its Spring 2008 
Economic Forecast (i.e. before the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis erupted) versus the projections released 
18 months later in its Autumn 2009 Economic 
Forecast. For all countries, given the new ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures and the stronger than initially 
expected worsening of the macroeconomic 
environment, the deterioration in the primary 
balance is much stronger than anticipated one 
and a half years earlier. The main sources of risk 
for ﬁ  scal sustainability related to these adverse 
See also Chapter 3 and Box 5 for a discussion of the main driving  46 
factors of the primary balance during the crisis.
balance from a moderate surplus to a large deﬁ  cit; (ii) the so-called snow-ball effect, which 
captures the joint impact of the interest expenditures on the accumulated stock of debt and of real 
GDP growth and inﬂ  ation on the debt ratio; and (iii) the stock-ﬂ  ow adjustments, which comprise 
inter alia the accumulation of ﬁ  nancial assets and valuation changes.
From equation (1) a simple condition for achieving a constant debt-to-GDP ratio can be obtained, 
namely:
 




According to equation (2) a stable debt ratio requires the government to generate a sufﬁ  cient 
primary surplus if the implicit interest rate on outstanding debt exceeds the nominal growth rate 
of the economy and if the stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment is positive. Otherwise, in the presence of a 
positive stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment, primary deﬁ  cits are compatible with a stable trajectory for the 
debt ratio only if the interest-growth rate differential (i – g) is sufﬁ  ciently negative. Therefore, 
under the assumption that the implicit interest rate on government debt and the nominal growth 
rate of the economy are given or exogenously determined, the primary balance is the variable 
governments can control in order to achieve ﬁ  scal sustainability.
The euro area government debt-to-GDP ratio: changes and underlying factors
Average 
2003-07 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio (% of GDP) 68.6  69.3  78.2  84.0  88.2
Change in the debt ratio (p.p. of GDP) -0.4  3.3  8.9  5.8  4.2
Contribution to change: 
Primary balance 
(- for surplus, + for deﬁ  cit)  -0.9  -1.0 3.4 3.7 3.1
Snow-ball  effect  0.3 1.1 4.9 1.8 1.1
of which:
Interest  expenditure  3.0 3.0   3.0 3.2   3.4
Growth effect -1.4 -0.4 2.9 -0.5 -1.2
Inﬂ   ation  effect  -1.4 -1.5 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1
Stock-ﬂ   ow  adjustment  0.3 3.2 0.6 0.3 0.1
Source: European Commission (2009f, p. 31).47
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developments in the primary balance are the 
following: 
First, even if the ﬁ  scal stimulus measures were 
to be quickly removed, this would in most 
euro area countries not sufﬁ   ce to return to 
debt-stabilising primary surpluses. Generally, 
a full assessment of the impact of ﬁ  scal activism 
on the sustainability of public ﬁ  nances requires 
consideration of the composition of ﬁ  scal 
stimulus measures, as well as their effectiveness 
in promoting growth both in the short and long 
run (see also Chapter 3). 
Second, the cyclical component of the primary 
deﬁ  cits may become structural to the extent that 
the higher unemployment rate turns out to be 
structural and potential output settles at a lower 
level than before the crisis. A prolonged period 
of lower output and revenue growth would thus 
render existing spending growth trends, which 
are reﬂ  ected in rising government expenditure-
to-GDP ratios, unsustainable. On top of this, 
the costs related to population ageing will 
increasingly take their toll on public ﬁ  nances 
by way of lower revenues from social security 
contributions and higher age-related expenditures 
(see Box 6 at the end of this chapter).
Third, further write-downs in the banking 
sector and losses in key industries may trigger 
additional government bailout operations 
involving guarantees. Expiring guarantees 
may be prolonged and further guarantees may 
be granted in the future. A non-negligible part 
of the government guarantees to ﬁ  nancial and 
non-ﬁ  nancial  ﬁ   rms may be called, in which 
case they would burden the government budget. 
Also, the higher level of retail deposit insurance, 
even when the costs are expected to be covered 
by the banking sector, would ultimately imply a 
risk that the government might potentially have 
to step in to repay deposit-holders in case of a 
more widespread failure of banks. This is true 
in particular for those euro area countries where 
governments promised a more or less unlimited 
guarantee for all retail deposits (see Chapter 2 
and European Commission, 2009b). 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
As the crisis unfolded, output growth prospects 
over the short term deteriorated drastically, 
triggering rising government debt-to-GDP 
ratios across the euro area countries. At the 
same time, long-term developments in output 
growth, estimates of potential growth and thus 
government debt developments are associated 
with a high degree of uncertainty at the current 
juncture. ECB (2009c) describes three possible 
scenarios for future developments in potential 
output. These entail a “full recovery scenario”, 
according to which the decline in potential 
output is only of a short-term nature as a 
post-crisis acceleration in potential growth 
would quickly realign the level of potential 
output with its long-term pre-crisis path. Second, 
in the “level shift scenario”, potential growth 
would stand at its long-term rate of 2.0% after 
the end of the downturn, but the level would not 
return to its long-term path. Finally, according 
to a “lower growth scenario”, there may not 
only be a downward shift in the level, but also 
a persistent slowdown in the rate of growth of 
potential output. 
In general, a lower (or negative) economic 
growth rate leads to an increase in both the 
debt-to-GDP ratio and the interest-growth rate 
differential, which in turn increases the speed of 
debt accumulation (see equation (2) in Box 5). 
Chart 9 Cumulated change in primary balances 
(2007-09) comparing EC Spring 2008 forecast 
and EC Autumn 2009 forecast
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Sources: European Commission (2009a and 2009f), ECB 
calculations.48
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Thus, in an environment of permanently lower 
growth, higher primary surpluses would be 
required to stabilise the government debt ratio 
and even higher primary surpluses to bring it 
onto a declining path. Although lower economic 
growth could improve the primary balance ratio 
through a denominator effect, permanently lower 
growth would also entail lower government 
revenues, thus putting additional downward 
pressure on the primary balance. Therefore, in 
the absence of ﬁ   scal consolidation measures, 
debt ratios would remain on a rising path. As 
noted above, rising government debt could also 
be detrimental to economic growth. 
INTEREST RATES 
Table 6 shows the development of the implicit 
interest rate on euro area government debt. 
It is calculated as the ratio of government 
interest expenditure to government gross debt. 
The decline in the implicit interest rate observed 
in 2009 can be linked to generally favourable 
ﬁ  nancing conditions for the vast majority of euro 
area governments (see Chapter 4). The “ﬂ  ight to 
safety” that followed when the crisis took hold 
brought an elevated demand for government 
securities that lowered on average the yields 
required by investors. 
However, these unique market conditions, 
reﬂ  ecting an elevated risk aversion as well as 
limited investment opportunities in the corporate 
sector, are likely to change in the future. 
As the recovery gains momentum, investors 
will likely return to more risky (corporate 
sector) securities. In addition, large government 
(re)ﬁ   nancing needs could trigger higher 
medium and long-term interest rates. The 
combination of rising government debt and 
higher ﬁ  nancing costs would imply ever-higher 
interest expenditure and require sufﬁ  ciently high 
primary surpluses to get out of this negative 
spiral and put the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio on a downward trajectory. 
STOCK-FLOW ADJUSTMENTS 
A positive stock-ﬂ   ow adjustment means that 
government gross debt increases by more 
than the annual deﬁ   cit (or decreases by less 
than implied by the surplus). The stock-ﬂ  ow 
adjustment consists of three main categories: 
(i) the net acquisition of ﬁ  nancial assets, which 
are recorded “below the line” as they do not 
contribute to the deﬁ  cit; (ii) ﬁ  nancial derivatives 
and other liabilities; and (iii) other adjustments 
(e.g. effects of face valuation, appreciation/
depreciation of foreign currency debt and other 
changes in volume). 
Over the past few years, the contribution of 
the stock-ﬂ   ow adjustment to changes in the 
euro area government debt-to-GDP ratio has 
been modest, though positive. For the period 
2004-2007 the stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment was 0.5% 
of GDP or less and the net acquisition of ﬁ  nancial 
assets has usually been the main explanatory 
factor. Since the ﬁ  nancial crisis the size of the 
stock-ﬂ   ow adjustment has recorded a sixfold 
increase, reaching 3.2% of GDP in 2008, against 
0.5% of GDP in 2007. 
The main reason underlying such a sharp 
increase in the stock-ﬂ   ow adjustment is the 
support extended by governments to ailing 
ﬁ  nancial institutions by way of capital injections 
and asset purchases, amounting to about 2.0% 
of GDP in 2008 (see Table 1 in Chapter 2). 
The direct effect on the gross debt stock will last 
until these assets can be sold again. Moreover, 
since governments have committed larger 
Table 6 Implicit interest rate on euro area government debt
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011
Government interest expenditure  % of GDP 2.9 3.0 3.0  3.2 3.4
Government gross debt  % of GDP 66.0 69.3 78.2 84.0  88.2
Implicit interest rate  % 4.39  4.33  3.86  3.81  3.85
Sources: European Commission (2009f), ECB calculations.49
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amounts of capital support to the ﬁ  nancial 
sector than were actually used and banks may 
yet be confronted with further write-downs, 
the possibility of additional recapitalisations 
cannot be ruled out. This would imply further 
contributions of the stock-ﬂ   ow adjustment to 
the level of debt. 
On the other hand, following a successful 
stabilisation of the banking sector, the 
restructuring of bank balance sheets and a 
sustained return to proﬁ  tability, governments 
may also be able to sell the ﬁ  nancial assets 
they acquired during the crisis and exit from 
the  ﬁ   nancial sector sooner rather than later. 
Generally, the medium-term ﬁ   scal cost of 
ﬁ  nancial support operations and thus the impact 
on ﬁ  scal sustainability will depend on the extent 
to which the assets acquired by the government 
keep their value and can be disinvested 
without losses. In this respect, uncertainty 
about the timing of asset disposals and the 
recovery rate from the sale of these assets is an 
additional source of ﬁ  scal risk (see Chapter 2). 
All in all, in the course of 2008-09 “below 
the line” operations have led government 
debt in the euro area to increase much faster 
than indicated by the government deﬁ  cit 
(see also Box 5). 
5.3  GOVERNMENT DEBT SCENARIOS
The following section presents some scenarios for 
possible developments in the general government 
debt ratio for the euro area until 2030. Their 
purpose is to provide a general idea of the 
magnitude of ﬁ   scal consolidation in the euro 
area needed to bring public ﬁ  nances back onto 
a sustainable path. In addition, a sensitivity 
analysis is provided. The focus is initially on 
euro area aggregates, thus abstracting from the 
existing heterogeneity among the euro area 
countries. However, this heterogeneity must 
be fully accounted for when designing ﬁ  scal 
exit strategies from the crisis, assessing debt 
management strategies or discussing issues related 
to the appropriate pace of ﬁ  scal  consolidation 
at the country level. Therefore, the euro area 
debt scenarios are followed by corresponding 
information for individual euro area countries. 
THREE BASELINE SCENARIOS
Three illustrative baseline scenarios for euro 
area debt developments are constructed:
The real GDP growth assumption which is    •
used for each of the three baseline scenarios 
is based on the path for the real potential 
growth rate of the euro area, as underlying 
the baseline long-term projections in 
European Commission and Economic 
Policy Committee (2009). According to 
this source, real potential growth gradually 
declines from 2.2% in 2011 to 1.5% in 2030. 
The increase in the GDP deﬂ  ator is assumed 
constant at 1.9% over the scenario period. 
The nominal implicit interest rate on    •
government debt is assumed constant at 
4.3%, the value recorded in 2008 (as the 
values in 2009-11 are distorted by the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis; see Table 6).
In all scenarios, the European Commission    •
(2009f) forecast for euro area general 
government debt in 2010 (84.0% of GDP) 
is used as a starting point. The starting 
value of the primary balance in 2010, based 
on the same source, is -3.7% of GDP; 
subsequent developments as from 2011 are 
determined by three ﬁ  scal  consolidation 
scenarios (see below). The assumptions 
for the primary balance associated with the 
three consolidation scenarios are depicted 
in Chart 10. Since economic growth is 
assumed to be at its potential over the period 
2011-30, the annual changes in the 
overall budget balance correspond to the 
changes in the structural budget balance 
(see Chart 11). 
The green scenario (dashed line) assumes a    •
rapid ﬁ  scal consolidation with the primary 
balance improving by 1.0 percentage point 
of GDP per year until a balanced budget is 
reached (in 2018). Afterwards, a primary 50
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balance compatible with a balanced budget 
is maintained over the projection horizon, 
i.e. until 2030. 
The blue scenario (dotted line) assumes    •
a less ambitious consolidation path, with 
the primary balance improving by only 
0.5 percentage point of GDP per year until a 
balanced budget is reached (in 2025). Primary 
surpluses compatible with a balanced budget 
are then maintained until 2030.
The red scenario (smooth line) assumes    •
that no consolidation effort takes place. 
The primary balance remains at -3.7% of 
GDP, i.e. constant at the forecast value 
for 2010. 
The results of these euro area debt scenarios are 
shown in Chart 12. The government debt ratio 
peaks in the green scenario in 2013 at 89.3% of 
GDP and in the blue scenario in 2017 at 97.2% 
of GDP. Both the green and the blue scenarios 
subsequently lead to a gradual decline of the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio. The 60% of 
GDP reference value is reached within the next 
two decades only in the green scenario (i.e. in 
2026). The red scenario leads to a steady rise in 
the government debt ratio that exceeds 100% of 
GDP in 2015, 120% in 2020 and 150% in 2026. 
Obviously, the results of these scenarios are 
highly sensitive to the underlying assumptions. 
This notwithstanding, they serve to illustrate the 
risks for ﬁ  scal sustainability for the euro area. 
These risks are much more pronounced for some 
individual countries, in particular for those that 
already had high or very high debt ratios before 
the crisis and for those that face high or very 
high deﬁ  cits after the crisis. Moreover, the risks 
to ﬁ  scal sustainability may be compounded by 
negative feedback effects, if rising government 
Chart 10 Assumptions about the primary 





























Chart 11 Overall budget balance 























Chart 12 Government debt for the euro area 
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debt ratios would trigger higher real interest rates 
and/or reduce economic growth. This in turn may 
also raise the likelihood of further write-downs 
by banks and a call on government guarantees. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In order to illustrate the sensitivity of the 
results related to the choice of the underlying 
assumptions, this section separately considers 
the impact of lower than assumed economic 
growth, higher interest rates and higher ﬁ  scal 
costs from the ﬁ   nancial crisis. The three 
consolidation scenarios (annual changes in the 
primary balance) remain unchanged. 
First, potential growth is assumed to be 
0.5 percentage point lower than in the baseline. 
As shown in Chart 13, as expected, the 
consolidation paths under the less favourable 
growth assumption shift to less favourable 
outcomes (thick lines) than in the baseline 
scenarios (thin lines). Only in the green scenario 
would the debt-to-GDP ratio fall to the 60% of 
GDP threshold within the period until 2030.
Second, the nominal implicit interest rate 
on government debt is assumed to be 
1.0 percentage point higher than in the 
baseline, i.e. 5.3%. As demonstrated in 
Chart 14, higher interest rates lead to a much 
faster accumulation of government debt in 
the blue and red scenarios. For example, 
in the blue scenario, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio now peaks at 104.5% in 2020, while it 
peaks at 97.2% in 2017 under the baseline 
assumptions. 
Third, as regards the ﬁ  nancial  crisis-related 
ﬁ  scal costs the assumption is made that half of 
the outstanding government guarantees 
(4.5% of GDP)  47 are called in 2011. Table 7 
shows the impact. In the rows (a), no future 
ﬁ  scal revenues from the reversal of earlier bank 
capital injections are considered to offset the 
ﬁ   scal costs related to these guarantees. 
The euro area governments’ guarantees related to the ﬁ  nancial  47 
crisis represent more than 9% of GDP over 2008-09, including 
the guarantees on special-purpose entities’ debt. See Table 2 in 
Chapter 2. 
Chart 13 Government debt scenarios for the 
euro area – potential output growth 0.5 p.p. 
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Source: ECB calculations.
Chart 14 Government debt scenarios for 
the euro area – interest rates 1 p.p. higher 
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This creates a level jump in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio in all three scenarios in 2011. Thereafter, 
the consolidation paths are almost parallel to 
the paths under the baseline. In the rows (b), 
the additional assumption is made that ﬁ  scal 
revenues over time fully offset the ﬁ  scal costs 
related to the call on guarantees (e.g. from 
repayments of loans provided to banks and 
governments gradually reselling the ﬁ  nancial 
assets they acquired back to the private sector) 
and these revenues would directly reduce 
government debt ratios. This would lead to a 
level jump in the debt-to-GDP ratio followed by 
a convergence of the debt-to-GDP path towards 
the baseline scenarios. 
DEBT SCENARIOS FOR EURO AREA COUNTRIES
The euro area countries entered the crisis with 
very heterogeneous budget balances, initial debt 
positions, interest burdens and growth prospects. 
This heterogeneity is evident from Chart 15, 
which displays the projected average nominal 
potential growth rates between 2010 and 2030 
and the implicit interest rates in 2008. At the 
same time, the heterogeneity is also given by the 
primary balance and government debt projected 
for 2010 as shown in Chart 16. 
To construct debt scenarios for the individual 
euro area countries, the same methodology as 
applied in the three baseline scenarios for the 
euro area is used, based on the variables 
underlying Charts 15 and 16. Table 8 summarises 
the ﬁ  ndings. The government debt-to-GDP ratios 
are depicted for the years 2015, 2020 and 2030 
under the three scenarios, in red, blue and green, 
as described above. The assumptions on which 
the green scenario is based, in particular the 
annual improvement of the primary balance by 
Table 7 Government debt scenarios 
for the euro area – call on guarantees 1)
(percentage of GDP)
Scenario  2010 2015 2020 2030
Red  (a) 84.0 107.9 128.4 177.1
(b) 84.0 107.0 126.6 173.6
Blue (a) 84.0 100.3 100.6  75.4
(b) 84.0 99.5 98.8 72.5
Green (a) 84.0 92.8 77.8 54.1
(b) 84.0 91.9 76.1 51.8
Sources: European Commission (2009f) for 2010, ECB 
calculations otherwise.
1) Assuming that in 2011 4.5% of GDP of outstanding guarantees 
are called with (a) no offsetting revenues (from the reversal of 
bank capital injections) or (b) with such offsetting revenues used 
to reduce government debt.
Chart 15 Nominal potential growth rates 










































x-axis: nominal potential growth rate (average 2010-30)
y-axis: implicit interest rate in 2008
Sources: Real potential growth rates – European Commission 
and Economic Policy Committee (2009); implicit interest rates – 
European Commission (2009f).
Note: Nominal potential growth rates are derived from real 
growth rates and assumed annual inﬂ  ation of 1.9%.
Chart 16 Primary balance and government 
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1 percentage point of GDP until the overall 
budget is balanced and maintenance of this 
overall balanced budget thereafter, would bring 
government debt in most euro area countries 
below 60% of GDP by 2030. The red scenario, in 
which the primary ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cit is maintained 
unchanged at the 2010 level during the whole 
simulation period 2011-30, would lead to 
government debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding or 
being close to 200% of GDP by 2030 in several 
euro area countries. Clearly, countries with a 
worse starting position than the euro area average 
(i.e. with a higher primary deﬁ  cit and/or higher 
government debt-to-GDP ratio) will need to 
implement a relatively more ambitious ﬁ  scal 
effort in order to reverse the unsustainable ﬁ  scal 
trends.  48
An important caveat to these calculations is that 
the country assumptions for nominal potential 
growth and implicit interest rates, based on 
pre-crisis sources, may substantially differ in 
the aftermath of the crisis. Euro area countries 
facing lower potential growth or higher interest 
rates on government debt after the crisis will be 
confronted with even greater challenges to ﬁ  scal 
sustainability than shown in Table 8. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The above simulations over the period 
2010-30 point to the risk of a rapidly rising euro 
area government debt-to-GDP ratio. Assuming 
unchanged  ﬁ  scal policies, this would pose a 
clear threat to the longer-term sustainability 
of public ﬁ  nances. Notwithstanding the high 
uncertainty surrounding future economic 
developments, this chapter has identiﬁ  ed the 
channels through which debt sustainability is 
put at risk. These include the combined effect 
of sustained high primary deﬁ  cits, a prolonged 
episode of slow output growth, as well as a 
possible rise in interest rates. In addition, the 
ﬁ  scal costs of emergency bank support may turn 
out to be higher than expected. Furthermore, 
rising government indebtedness may itself 
trigger higher interest rates and contribute to 
On successful experiences with government debt reduction in  48 
euro area countries in the run-up to EMU, see ECB (2009d).




2010 2015 2020 2030 2015 2020 2030 2015 2020 2030
Belgium 101.2 108.2 117.1 140.2 100.9 89.8 58.5 93.3 73.8 47.1
Germany 76.7 86.9 98.4 128.5 79.8 71.2 52.9 72.0 60.1 44.7
Ireland 82.9 132.0 181.5 284.1 124.7 154.7 182.3 117.3 128.0 92.8
Greece 124.9 156.5 189.3 272.5 149.0 161.8 162.4 141.5 134.4 93.1
Spain 66.3 100.1 131.1 199.0 92.7 104.6 97.3 85.3 78.1 50.2
France 82.5 107.6 132.7 184.7 100.1 105.4 83.5 92.7 80.4 55.5
Italy 116.7 121.3 125.6 137.9 118.4 102.7 71.5 106.3 87.5 60.9
Cyprus 58.6 70.7 81.8 106.1 63.4 55.7 33.4 56.1 42.0 25.1
Luxembourg 16.4 31.6 47.2 80.2 24.3 23.2 21.8 19.0 18.4 18.7
Malta 70.9 76.9 82.3 98.8 71.8 58.7 38.9 62.8 49.4 32.8
Netherlands 65.6 84.0 103.2 145.6 76.5 75.6 61.1 69.0 61.2 50.6
Austria 73.9 86.7 100.2 131.6 79.2 72.6 50.8 71.7 58.9 41.3
Portugal 84.6 107.9 130.8 174.5 100.5 103.5 78.8 93.0 80.6 57.7
Slovenia 42.8 66.5 91.2 155.7 59.1 63.9 56.2 51.7 45.6 41.1
Slovakia 39.2 55.4 72.3 112.0 48.2 46.5 37.1 41.0 34.5 29.3
Finland 47.4 60.2 73.3 100.7 52.8 46.4 16.7 45.4 28.7 3.1
Euro area 84.0 103.2 123.7 171.9 95.7 95.9 71.2 88.1 73.6 51.2
Sources: European Commission (2009f) for 2010, otherwise ECB calculations.
Notes: The red, blue and green scenarios stand for an annual improvement of the (structural) primary balance by 0%, 0.5% and 1.0% 
of GDP, respectively. See Charts 15 and 16 for the assumptions and starting values underlying the debt scenarios.54
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lower growth, creating a negative feedback 
loop. The risks to ﬁ  scal sustainability are even 
more pronounced, as the debt simulations 
do not take into account the projected rise in 
ageing-related costs. Especially after 2020, 
strong pressures on public ﬁ   nances must be 
expected on account of ageing populations 
(see Box 6). 
The Treaty requires Member States that wish to 
adopt the euro to maintain a government gross 
debt ratio below the reference value of 60% 
of GDP, or else to ensure that the debt ratio 
is sufﬁ   ciently diminishing and approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace. As 
a consequence of the crisis, many euro area 
countries that fulﬁ   lled this criterion upon 
joining EMU will need to realign their ﬁ  scal 
policies so as to bring their debt ratios back 
onto a steadily declining path and to limit the 
debt servicing burden for future generations. 
Even with consolidation efforts of 0.5% of 
GDP annually, the return to the pre-crisis 
euro area debt ratio is likely to take more 
than two decades. Substantially higher annual 
consolidation would thus be required to ensure 
a more rapid decline in the debt ratio towards 
the 60% of GDP reference value and below. 
The challenges are particularly pronounced 
for euro area countries with high or very 
high government deﬁ   cits and/or debt ratios 
after the crisis and for those countries which 
face relatively high interest rates and low 
potential growth.
Box 6
AGEING COSTS AND RISKS TO FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 1
The government debt simulations in this chapter abstract from the projected impact of changes 
in age-related public expenditure that are expected to result from the ageing of society. 
This reﬂ  ects that governments may prefer to undertake pension and health care reforms to 
tackle the rising budgetary pressures from 
ageing rather than allowing these to crowd out 
other budget items. According to the baseline 
scenario of the European Commission and the 
Economic Policy Committee (2009), the ratio 
of age-related public expenditure to GDP in the 
euro area is projected to rise by 5.2 percentage 
points over the period 2007-60 under a 
no-policy-change assumption. There are, 
however, large differences across the euro 
area countries (see table on the next page). The 
projections also show that the rise in public 
pension expenditure in the euro area is expected 
to accelerate after 2020 before slowing down 
somewhat after 2050 (see chart).
Overall, accounting for the projected increase 
in age-related expenditure would imply that – 
under a no-policy-change assumption – 
primary budget deﬁ  cits and thus government 
1  Prepared by Nadine Leiner-Killinger.
Public pension expenditure in the euro area 
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debt-to-GDP ratios would turn out even higher than in the scenarios presented in this chapter.2 
Furthermore, following the dramatic decline in the value of assets in the funded components 
of private and public pension systems, there may potentially be pressure on governments to 
compensate for these ﬁ  nancial losses in order to provide the elderly with an adequate living 
standard, thus raising risks to ﬁ  scal sustainability. 
2  For more details on ﬁ  scal sustainability in the EU countries taking into account changes in age-related expenditure, see European 
Commission (2009e). See also Balassone et al. (2009).
Age-related government expenditure in the euro area, 2007-60
(levels in percentage of GDP; changes in percentage points of GDP)
Pensions Health care Long-term care Unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts
Education Total
Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change
2007 2007-60 2007 2007-60 2007 2007-60 2007 2007-60 2007 2007-60 2007 2007-60
Belgium 10.0 4.8 7.6 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.9 -0.4 5.5 0.0 26.5 6.9
Germany 10.4 2.3 7.4 1.8 0.9 1.4 0.9 -0.3 3.9 -0.4 23.6 4.8
Ireland 5.2 6.1 5.8 1.8 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.1 4.5 -0.3 17.2 8.9
Greece 11.7 12.4 5.0 1.4 1.4 2.2 0.3 -0.1 3.7 0.0 22.1 15.9
Spain 8.4 6.7 5.5 1.6 0.5 0.9 1.3 -0.4 3.5 0.1 19.3 9.0
France 13.0 1.0 8.1 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.2 -0.3 4.7 0.0 28.4 2.7
Italy 14.0 -0.4 5.9 1.1 1.7 1.3 0.4 0.0 4.1 -0.3 26.0 1.6
Cyprus 6.3 11.4 2.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.1 6.1 -1.2 15.4 10.8
Luxembourg 8.7 15.2 5.8 1.2 1.4 2.0 0.4 0.0 3.8 -0.5 20.0 18.0
Malta 7.2 6.2 4.7 3.3 1.0 1.6 0.4 0.0 5.0 -1.0 18.2 10.2
Netherlands 6.6 4.0 4.8 1.0 3.4 4.7 1.1 -0.1 4.6 -0.2 20.5 9.4
Austria 12.8 0.9 6.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.0 4.8 -0.5 26.0 3.1
Portugal 11.4 2.1 7.2 1.9 0.1 0.1 1.2 -0.4 4.6 -0.3 24.5 3.4
Slovenia 9.9 8.8 6.6 1.9 1.1 1.8 0.2 0.0 5.1 0.4 22.9 12.8
Slovakia 6.8 3.4 5.0 2.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 -0.1 3.1 -0.8 15.2 5.2
Finland 10.0 3.3 5.5 1.0 1.8 2.6 1.2 -0.2 5.7 -0.3 24.2 6.3
Euro area 11.1 2.8 6.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.0 -0.2 4.2 -0.2 24.3 5.2
Sources: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009).56
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6  EURO AREA FISCAL POLICIES: 
EXIT FROM THE CRISIS MODE  49 
6.1 INTRODUCTION
As shown in previous chapters, the ﬁ  scal costs 
of the crisis are considerable. Within a short 
period of time, all euro area governments have 
experienced a sharp reversal of their budget 
balances, some of them moving far away from 
their previous apparently sound ﬁ  scal positions 
(see Table 9). The rapid rise in government 
indebtedness, the budgetary risks from higher 
interest rates, a prolonged period of low growth, 
extensive contingent liabilities and the rising 
costs from ageing populations, have raised 
concerns over the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances. 
This rapid ﬁ  scal deterioration also puts strong 
pressure on the EU institutional framework for 
ensuring sustainable public ﬁ  nances. Moreover, 
the coordinated short-term ﬁ  scal response to 
the recession contributing to excessive deﬁ  cits 
in most euro area countries points to a number 
of challenges for the functioning and credibility 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
Looking ahead, the ﬁ   scal authorities face the 
challenge of how to exit from the crisis mode 
and return to sound and sustainable ﬁ  scal 
positions. They will also need to address 
the weaknesses related to past policies that 
were exposed by the crisis. This chapter 
discusses these challenges in more detail. 
Section 6.2 argues in favour of a timely exit 
from the crisis mode and develops the main 
principles for the ﬁ  scal consolidation strategies. 
Section 6.3 summarises a number of 
crisis-related challenges for the proper 
functioning of the EU ﬁ  scal framework and how 
they could be addressed. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2  FISCAL EXIT AND CONSOLIDATION 
STRATEGIES 
Exit strategies represent a key issue for the 
conduct of ﬁ  scal policies in the recovery phase. 
The exit strategies should include at least three 
dimensions: (i) phasing-out of the ﬁ  nancial 
assistance to the banking sector, (ii) unwinding 
ﬁ  scal stimuli and restoring ﬁ  scal sustainability, 
and (iii) growth-enhancing structural reforms. 
Prepared by Philipp Rother and Vilém Valenta. 49 
Table 9 Government budget balance and debt ratios in the euro area
(percentage of GDP)
Budget balance Debt
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Belgium -0.2 -1.2 -5.9 -5.8 -5.8 84.2 89.8 97.2 101.2 104.0
Germany 0.2 0.0 -3.4 -5.0 -4.6 65.0 65.9 73.1 76.7 79.7
Ireland 0.3 -7.2 -12.5 -14.7 -14.7 25.1 44.1 65.8 82.9 96.2
Greece -3.7 -7.7 -12.7 -12.2 -12.8 95.6 99.2 112.6 124.9 135.4
Spain 1.9 -4.1 -11.2 -10.1 -9.3 36.1 39.7 54.3 66.3 74.0
France -2.7 -3.4 -8.3 -8.2 -7.7 63.8 67.4 76.1 82.5 87.6
Italy -1.5 -2.7 -5.3 -5.3 -5.1 103.5 105.8 114.6 116.7 117.8
Cyprus 3.4 0.9 -3.5 -5.7 -5.9 58.3 48.4 53.2 58.6 63.4
Luxembourg 3.7 2.5 -2.2 -4.2 -4.2 6.6 13.5 15.0 16.4 17.7
Malta -2.2 -4.7 -4.5 -4.4 -4.3 62.0 63.8 68.5 70.9 72.5
Netherlands 0.2 0.7 -4.7 -6.1 -5.6 45.5 58.2 59.8 65.6 69.7
Austria -0.6 -0.4 -4.3 -5.5 -5.3 59.5 62.6 69.1 73.9 77.0
Portugal -2.6 -2.7 -8.0 -8.0 -8.7 63.6 66.3 77.4 84.6 91.1
Slovenia 0.0 -1.8 -6.3 -7.0 -6.9 23.3 22.5 35.1 42.8 48.2
Slovakia -1.9 -2.3 -6.3 -6.0 -5.5 29.3 27.7 34.6 39.2 42.7
Finland 5.2 4.5 -2.8 -4.5 -4.3 35.2 34.1 41.3 47.4 52.7
Euro area -0.6 -2.0 -6.4 -6.9 -6.5 66.0 69.3 78.2 84.0 88.2
Source: European Commission (2009f).57
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This section does not cover the ﬁ  rst aspect of the 
exit mode,50 but focuses instead on the second, 
while taking account of the third aspect. 
NEED FOR TIMELY AND CREDIBLE FISCAL EXIT 
AND CONSOLIDATION STRATEGIES
Many economic arguments support the need for 
a timely and credible ﬁ  scal exit from the crisis 
mode. First, sound ﬁ  scal positions in line with 
the requirements of the SGP are an important 
prerequisite for the smooth functioning of 
EMU. High government deﬁ   cits and debt at 
the euro area level represent an upside risk to 
price stability and place an additional burden 
on the ECB’s monetary policy. Persisting large 
ﬁ  scal imbalances could also severely constrain 
the scope for ﬁ   scal policy action should any 
emergency need arise. At the national level, 
they may fuel the accumulation of other 
macroeconomic imbalances, such as current 
account deﬁ   cits, which make countries more 
vulnerable to negative shocks. Moreover, 
wide-ranging differences in ﬁ  scal positions can 
contribute to economic divergences within the 
euro area. 
Second, while governments appear to have been 
successful in bolstering public conﬁ  dence via 
economic support in the recession phase, in the 
exit phase conﬁ  dence must be preserved via a 
timely withdrawal of the ﬁ  scal stimulus measures 
and credible consolidation. Well-speciﬁ  ed  and 
duly communicated ﬁ   scal exit strategies are 
of great importance to reduce market concerns 
about  ﬁ   scal sustainability and support public 
conﬁ  dence.
Third, the need to ﬁ  nance large deﬁ  cits, bank 
rescue packages and debt roll-over have made 
governments more vulnerable to and may even 
trigger rapid changes in market sentiment, 
leading to higher medium and long-term interest 
rates (see Chapter 4). This may force them to 
adopt pro-cyclical restrictive ﬁ  scal policies to 
restore conﬁ   dence. The upward pressure on 
interest rates also risks crowding out private 
investment, with adverse implications for 
potential growth.
Fourth, while in response to the ﬁ  nancial and 
economic crisis governments have assumed a 
more active role in managing the economy 
(see Chapters 2 and 3), historical experience 
shows that the market principle remains the best 
basis for a well-functioning economic system.51 
Therefore, state involvement in the private 
sector should be scaled down again, in line with 
EU state aid rules, and government interventions 
to support domestic demand should remain the 
exception rather than become the new rule. 
When designing and implementing ﬁ  scal 
exit strategies, the proper timing, pace and 
composition of the consolidation measures 
are the core issues. On the one hand, ﬁ  scal 
consolidation should start as soon as possible 
in order to limit the accumulation of ﬁ  scal 
imbalances, which may hamper long-term 
economic growth. On the other hand, the risks 
of a premature ﬁ  scal restriction for the recovery 
should be considered. There is evidence, 
however, that ﬁ  scal consolidation may have a 
positive impact on economic growth, if credible 
and properly designed (see Box 7).
For a discussion of governments’ exit strategies from emergency  50 
measures in support of the ﬁ   nancial sector, see European 
Commission (2009c and 2009d) and OECD (2009b).
See also Stark (2009). 51 58
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Box 7
FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  1
Conventional Keynesian theory suggests that ﬁ  scal consolidations can be harmful to output growth 
in the short run due to their negative impact on aggregate demand. This makes the decision when 
to start ﬁ  scal consolidation and how fast to proceed more complex. However, risks to short-term 
growth need to be weighed against possible adverse impacts on the credibility of governments’ 
commitment to sound public ﬁ   nances that could result from unambitious consolidation. 
Eventually, there is a risk that failure to consolidate will undermine long-term ﬁ  scal sustainability. 
A number of considerations suggest that the downside effects of ﬁ  scal consolidation on growth 
need not dominate. In theory, expectation effects could even more than offset the contractionary 
impact on growth of ﬁ   scal consolidations (the so-called non-Keynesian ﬁ  scal  effects). 
For instance, a signiﬁ   cant and sustained reduction of government expenditures may lead 
consumers to assume that this will create room in the medium term for a permanent tax 
reduction. In that case, an expected increase in permanent income may lead to a rise in private 
consumption, also generating a better environment for private investment. However, if the 
reduction in government spending is small and temporary, or not credible, private consumption 
may not respond positively to the ﬁ  scal cutback.2
In addition, Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997) argue that a ﬁ  scal consolidation that credibly 
attempts to reduce public sector borrowing may produce an induced positive wealth effect, 
leading to an increase in private consumption. Furthermore, the reduction of the government 
borrowing requirement diminishes the risk premium associated with government debt issuance, 
which reduces real interest rates and allows the crowding-in of private investment. The empirical 
evidence does not seem to fully convey whether observed expansionary effects following ﬁ  scal 
consolidations are driven by expectations about future disposable income or other factors, such 
as supply-side or structural reforms, monetary policy adjustments or exchange rate depreciation 
accompanying the ﬁ  scal consolidation.3 
Afonso (2010) reports for the 15 “old” EU countries some evidence in favour of the existence 
of expansionary ﬁ  scal consolidations, for a few budgetary spending items (government ﬁ  nal 
consumption and social transfers), depending on the speciﬁ  cation and on the time span used. 
In addition, Giudice et al. (2007) argue that around half of the ﬁ  scal consolidations in the EU in 
the last 30 years have been followed by higher growth. Hauptmeier et al. (2007) conduct case 
studies and ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  scal consolidations based on expenditure reforms were the most likely to 
promote growth. Several other studies also ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  scal consolidations have had only limited 
negative implications for real GDP growth in many instances, with diverse impacts of public 
spending shocks on output.4 In this regard, the quality of ﬁ  scal consolidation plans and structural 
reforms will play an important role with respect to the ensuing growth effect in the medium 
to longer run. Governments would thus be well advised to pursue ﬁ  scal reforms that enhance 
the efﬁ  ciency of government expenditure and taxation systems, in combination with structural 
reforms in labour and product markets.
1    Prepared by António Afonso.
2  See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), McDermott and Wescott (1996), and Alesina and Ardagna (1998). 
3  See Briotti (2005) for a survey and Afonso (2010) for results on the composition of ﬁ  scal adjustment.
4  See Afonso and González Alegre (2008) and Afonso and Sousa (2009) for empirical evidence on the ﬁ  scal effects in the 15 “old” 
EU countries and in the United States.59
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PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR FISCAL EXIT 
AND CONSOLIDATION STRATEGIES
In order to achieve the aforementioned main 
objectives,  ﬁ   scal exit and consolidation 
strategies should be based on the following 
common principles:52
The Treaty and the Stability and Growth    •
Pact provide the appropriate framework for 
credible and well-speciﬁ  ed  ﬁ   scal exit and 
consolidation strategies, which should be 
communicated and implemented in a timely 
fashion.
The provisions of the Treaty and the SGP 
should be fully implemented. They provide 
for a considerable degree of ﬂ  exibility to take 
account of country-speciﬁ  c  circumstances. 
Countries with current or planned deﬁ  cits above 
3% of GDP or facing high debt ratios should 
be subject to a strengthened surveillance under 
the excessive deﬁ  cit procedure (EDP). In any 
case, these countries should not further pursue 
expansionary ﬁ  scal policies and should shift to 
consolidation in order to correct the excessive 
deﬁ  cits in accordance with the ECOFIN Council 
recommendations.
The structural adjustment should start no    •
later than the economic recovery. Where 
necessary, it should be signiﬁ  cantly larger 
than the minimum required annual structural 
adjustment of 0.5% of GDP.
The deadlines for the correction of excessive 
deﬁ  cits need to be ambitious. According to the 
SGP, an excessive deﬁ  cit should as a rule be 
corrected “in the year after its identiﬁ  cation, 
unless there are special circumstances” 
(see Box 8). While the room for consolidation 
may be limited as long as economic growth 
remains negative or very low, much stronger 
efforts in structural terms should be feasible 
once economic recovery starts. A relapse in the 
recovery and/or lower than previously assumed 
potential growth should not automatically be 
seen as implying that further postponement 
or watering-down of consolidation efforts 
would necessarily be justiﬁ   ed. Under normal 
circumstances, the annual minimum structural 
adjustment benchmark is 0.5% of GDP. 
As shown in Chapter 5, the minimum structural 
adjustment implies excessive debt levels 
persisting for very long periods of time in 
many euro area countries. For countries with 
very high government deﬁ  cits or debts, even an 
annual adjustment of 1.0% of GDP implies that 
the government debt-to-GDP ratio could not be 
reduced to below the 60% of GDP reference 
value over an acceptable time horizon. At the 
same time, it appears unlikely that countries will 
be able to rely on strong real GDP growth to 
reduce their debt burdens. Therefore, unwinding 
ﬁ  scal stimuli, while necessary and in principle 
relatively easy to achieve, is clearly insufﬁ  cient 
to restore sustainable public ﬁ  nances in most 
countries. Most likely, a very large structural 
consolidation effort over a long time span will 
be needed in order to adjust public ﬁ  nances 
to the new economic environment. In this 
regard, the ECOFIN Council conclusions of 
October  2009, which call for consolidation to 
start in 2011 at the latest and to go well beyond 
the structural benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per 
annum, represent the minimum requirement for 
all euro area countries. 
The  ﬁ   scal consolidation plans should be    •
based on realistic and cautious growth 
assumptions, with a strong focus on 
expenditure reforms. 
As a result of the crisis, (potential) output 
growth may be lower for a prolonged period 
of time, which needs to be reﬂ   ected in the 
ﬁ   scal consolidation plans. The composition of 
the  ﬁ  scal adjustment should be tailored to the 
needs of individual countries. However, past 
evidence on successful ﬁ  scal corrections suggests 
that expenditure-based consolidation is to be 
preferred, as the tax burden is already high in 
most euro area countries and further tax increases 
risk impeding competitiveness and incentives to 
work, invest and innovate. The expected increase 
For the principles adopted by Ministers of Finance see 52    the 
Eurogroup “Orientations for ﬁ  scal policies in euro area Member 
States” dated 8 June 2009 and the ECOFIN “Council conclusions 
on ﬁ  scal exit strategy” of 20 October 2009. 60
ECB
Occasional Paper No 109
April 2010
of age-related expenditures and the risk of 
higher interest payments from rising government 
debt levels call for additional restraint on the 
expenditure side. Last but not least, the exit 
strategies should ensure also the durability of ﬁ  scal 
consolidation and consider structural aspects. 
In this regard, they should be characterised by 
structural reforms that systematically reduce long-
term public expenditure dynamics and promote 
long-term growth.
The ﬁ  scal exit and consolidation strategies    •
need to go beyond the correction of excessive 
deﬁ  cits.
In line with the preventive arm of the Pact, 
countries should build a safety margin to help 
them to avoid a repeated breach of the 3% of 
GDP reference value for the deﬁ  cit and aim to 
reach their medium-term objective as soon as 
possible. Therefore, they should maintain the 
pace of consolidation until their medium-term 
ﬁ  scal position is close to balance or in surplus. 
More signiﬁ  cant progress should be required in 
particular if the economic situation permits, i.e. 
in “good times”.
When applying these common principles, 
country-speciﬁ   c circumstances may be taken 
into account. In this respect, the following 
criteria could be considered:
The level and expected dynamics of    –
government deﬁ  cit and/or debt ratios: How 
far are the projected deﬁ   cit and/or debt 
ratios above the reference values and are 
they still rising? Ceteris paribus, more 
unfavourable ﬁ  scal positions call for more 
ambitious and faster implementation of 
consolidation strategies. 
Expected duration of the recession:    – When is 
the recovery taking hold and the economy 
on a path of self-sustaining growth? 
As long as “special circumstances” apply 
(see Box 8), notably a continuation of 
negative or very low economic growth, a 
later or smaller structural adjustment could 
be warranted. However, those countries with 
very high deﬁ   cits and/or debt ratios must 
take immediate corrective action to avoid 
that their public ﬁ  nances get out of control. 
In addition, one may consider the supplementary 
information on:
Past ﬁ  scal performance:    – Was a sound ﬁ  scal 
position achieved and maintained before 
the onset of the crisis? Achievement of and 
adherence to its medium-term budgetary 
objective may be taken as an indication 
of a country’s general commitment to 
ﬁ   scal discipline. The absence of a good 
“track record” in this respect may warrant 
a somewhat stricter implementation of the 
provisions of the SGP, especially if the excess 
over the 3% of GDP reference value for 
the deﬁ  cit is expected to be relatively large.
Extent of contingent liabilities:    – What are 
the projected ﬁ   scal costs of ageing and 
how signiﬁ   cant are explicit and implicit 
contingent liabilities stemming from 
measures to support the ﬁ  nancial  sector 
and non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms? Ceteris paribus, the 
greater the challenges to ﬁ  scal sustainability 
from off-balance-sheet liabilities, the earlier 
and more forceful the ﬁ  scal  adjustment 
should be.
Existence of other macroeconomic    –
vulnerabilities:  What are the risks from 
current account deﬁ   cits, how large is the 
need to strengthen competitiveness, and do 
households and ﬁ   rms face high levels of 
indebtedness? Where ﬁ  scal  developments 
contribute to sustained vulnerabilities in 
other areas of the economy, structural ﬁ  scal 
reforms will be necessary to address these 
vulnerabilities. 
6.3 CRISIS-RELATED  CHALLENGES 
FOR THE EU FISCAL FRAMEWORK 
Fiscal sustainability is vital for the smooth 
functioning of EMU and a precondition for 
long-term stability and growth. The EU ﬁ  scal 
framework, as embedded in the Treaty and the 61
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SGP, serves as the coordination mechanism to 
ensure sustainable public ﬁ  nances in Member 
States. This section describes a number of 
challenges for the proper functioning of the EU 
ﬁ  scal framework stemming from the crisis. 
WEAK INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES FOR FISCAL 
DISCIPLINE? 
Fiscal surveillance in the EU is based on 
quantitative and qualitative monitoring of 
national ﬁ  scal developments. On the quantitative 
side, the Treaty’s reference values for the 
government deﬁ  cit and debt ratios represent the 
most fundamental and transparent indicators. 
They are supplemented by country-speciﬁ  c 
ﬁ   scal targets, the so-called medium-term 
objectives (MTOs). The quantitative information 
is supplemented by stability programmes, which 
present euro area governments’ macroeconomic 
assumptions and ﬁ   scal policy intentions in 
some detail. The ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis, 
the coordinated ﬁ  scal policy response and the 
subsequent excessive deﬁ  cit and debt levels in 
most euro area countries have raised a number 
of questions about the credibility of the Treaty 
and the SGP in maintaining ﬁ  scal discipline. 
First, the crisis has demonstrated the vital 
importance of establishing and maintaining 
sound  ﬁ   scal positions, in line with or even 
beyond MTOs, in order to have room for 
manoeuvre to respond to a negative shock. 
Over the past years, however, the role of 
MTOs as a tool to promote ﬁ  scal  discipline 
has been limited. The incentives set by the 
EU  ﬁ   scal framework had to counterbalance 
national policy interests in countries with little 
domestic political pressure for consolidation. 
As documented in ECB (2008b), the reform 
of the SGP in 2005 has so far been a mixed 
success. With regard to the corrective arm 
of the SGP, all excessive deﬁ  cits of euro area 
countries were eventually corrected by 2008, 
albeit supported by favourable economic 
conditions and after long delays in meeting 
the deadlines in some cases. Regarding the 
preventive arm, the MTOs have not become a 
ﬁ  rm anchor for the EU ﬁ  scal framework, despite 
repeated agreements at the Eurogroup level that 
all euro area countries should have reached their 
MTO by a speciﬁ  c year. The perception of the 
MTOs as binding ﬁ  scal targets was in general 
lacking. Some euro area countries pursued more 
ambitious ﬁ  scal targets for domestic purposes, 
whereas others more or less ignored their MTOs. 
The benchmark for the annual minimum 
structural  ﬁ   scal adjustment of 0.5% of GDP 
was in general only rarely respected and “good 
times” were insufﬁ   ciently used to speed up 
consolidation.
Second, the activist ﬁ  scal policies in response 
to the expected deep recession, as agreed 
in the European Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP), arguably were in conﬂ  ict with Treaty 
Article 126.1 that “Member States shall avoid 
excessive government deﬁ  cits”. The fact that 
this discretionary ﬁ  scal loosening has been the 
direct result of a coordinated EU-wide approach 
also made it more difﬁ  cult to call a few months 
later for vigorous consolidation efforts in the 
excessive deﬁ   cit countries. In particular, the 
EERP called on Member States to take full 
advantage of the credibility and ﬂ  exibility 
offered by the SGP, as well as the protection 
that the euro offers against destabilising 
exchange rate movements which otherwise 
would have complicated national ﬁ  scal policy 
responses. As a consequence, the institutional 
coordination framework offered by the SGP has 
been complemented by an ad hoc coordination 
mechanism to deal with particularly large, 
common negative shocks. While some 
economic arguments could be found to support 
the chosen approach for addressing the crisis, 
there is a risk that this precedent will be used to 
justify coordinated expansionary ﬁ  scal policies 
outside the EU ﬁ   scal framework at times 
when this is not warranted. Beyond the risk of 
adverse economic outcomes, such behaviour 
would induce risks to the credibility of the EU 
ﬁ  scal framework.
Third, the ﬁ   scal stimulus measures generally 
did not foresee credible exit strategies which 
could have helped to create positive conﬁ  dence 62
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effects and anchor expectations about longer-
term ﬁ  scal sustainability.53 While the ECOFIN 
Council stated in January 2009 that “the 
coordinated ﬁ  scal stimulus will… be followed 
by a coordinated budget consolidation”, this 
joint commitment to ﬁ   scal discipline was 
then in most countries not followed up with 
well-speciﬁ  ed national plans to return to sound 
and sustainable public ﬁ   nances. This gave 
rise to the risk of a loss of market conﬁ  dence 
and an increase in sovereign risk premia 
resulting in higher long-term interest rates 
(see also Chapter 4). 
Fourth, the large ﬁ  scal imbalances now facing 
all euro area countries will make it more difﬁ  cult 
to enforce the disciplinary mechanism of peer 
pressure on which the EU ﬁ  scal framework is 
based. There is a clear risk that countries with 
high ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits will fail to put political pressure 
on their peers in a similar situation. This peer 
pressure mechanism is a key element in reaching 
ECOFIN Council conclusions that an excessive 
deﬁ   cit exists, issuing recommendations for 
ambitious start and end dates for their correction, 
giving further notice in case countries do not 
follow up, deciding on the application of sanction 
measures and, ﬁ  nally, concluding whether the 
excessive deﬁ  cit has been corrected (according 
to Treaty Articles  126.6-12).54 The ﬂ  exibility 
incorporated in the legal provisions of the 
SGP – which provide considerable room for 
manoeuvre in setting and extending the deadline 
for correcting an excessive deﬁ  cit in the face of 
“special circumstances” and “unexpected adverse 
economic events” – was already stretched to the 
limit when taking decisions under Article 126.7 
(see Box 8). Effective peer pressure is also 
important to promote transparent national 
budgets, as countries subject to excessive deﬁ  cit 
procedures may face incentives to engage in 
window-dressing and creative accounting to 
downplay and/or reduce the apparent size of 
their ﬁ  scal challenges.
Finally, the rapid increase in government debt 
ratios and contingent liabilities must lead to a 
commensurate strengthening of ﬁ  scal discipline 
and consolidation requirements. One of the 
objectives of the reform of the SGP in 2005 was 
to increase the focus on government debt and on 
safeguarding the sustainability of public ﬁ  nances 
in EU ﬁ  scal surveillance. Since the reform, for 
countries above the 60% of GDP reference 
value, the (ECOFIN) Council formulates 
recommendations on the debt dynamics in its 
opinions on the stability and convergence 
programmes of Member States.55 The fact that 
the EU ﬁ  scal surveillance procedures in practice 
tend to focus on deﬁ  cit developments points to 
the risk of giving insufﬁ  cient attention to the 
current negative debt dynamics and the potential 
destabilising properties of high and rising 
government debt-to-GDP ratios in a monetary 
union. 
All these developments suggest that the EU’s 
institutional mechanisms for ensuring ﬁ  scal 
discipline face a number of challenges at 
present, which could erode the ﬁ  scal pillar of 
EMU. The vigorous implementation of the 
corrective arm of the SGP is more uncertain than 
ever and all the euro area countries are a long 
way from complying with the medium-term 
objectives of the preventive arm. In the current 
situation, a powerful application of the EU ﬁ  scal 
framework enforcing credible ﬁ   scal exit and 
consolidation strategies and the return to sound 
and sustainable ﬁ   scal positions needs to be 
preserved and even strengthened. 
The IMF (2009c) warned European countries that a credible  53 
commitment to long-run ﬁ  scal discipline was essential to sustain 
market conﬁ  dence. Hence, it was crucial that any short-term 
ﬁ   scal actions be cast within a credible medium-term ﬁ  scal 
framework envisaging a ﬁ  scal correction as the crisis abated.
Stéclebout-Orseau and Hallerberg (2009) show that the more  54 
“sinners” with excessive deﬁ  cits there are in the EU, the weaker 
the peer pressure mechanism to take corrective action.
See “Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth  55 
Pact”, Council Report to the European Council, 21 March 2005.63
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Box 8
THE FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT IN TIMES OF CRISIS 1
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) aim to ensure the sustainability of public ﬁ   nances of Member States. 
They require EU countries not to exceed a government deﬁ  cit ratio of 3% of GDP and a 
government debt ratio of 60% of GDP and provide procedural steps for the correction of 
excessive deﬁ  cits in case one or both of these reference values is breached. Moreover, the 
so-called preventive arm of the SGP obliges countries to maintain sound budgetary positions. 
This box discusses the ﬂ  exibility provisions of the Treaty and the SGP that are relevant for 
taking into account the consequences of the crisis for public ﬁ  nances in the implementation of 
the procedures. 
Corrective arm
Under the Treaty (Article 126.1), Member States shall avoid excessive government deﬁ  cits. 
In case the 3% of GDP deﬁ  cit limit is breached, the Commission prepares a report to examine 
whether the “excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio 
remains close to the reference value” (Treaty Article 126.2-3). According to the relevant 
provisions,2 “exceptional” can mean an “unusual event outside the control of the Member State” 
(this could be a ﬁ  nancial crisis) or a “severe economic downturn”, including negative real GDP 
growth or a protracted period of very low output growth relative to its potential (such as in a 
deep or prolonged recession). In other words, if a country records a deﬁ  cit slightly above 3% of 
GDP in a given year due to exceptional circumstances and the excess is foreseen to be reversed 
in the following year, the country would not have to face the steps under the excessive deﬁ  cit 
procedure. In all other cases of a country’s deﬁ  cit exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value, the 
(ECOFIN) Council will decide on the existence of an excessive deﬁ  cit (Treaty Article 126.6). 
This was the case in 2009, as the deﬁ  cits notiﬁ  ed by many Member States were neither small nor 
temporary, even when it was accepted that the crisis circumstances were exceptional. As a result, 
13 out of 16 euro area countries were subject to an excessive deﬁ  cit procedure at the end of 2009 
(Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Slovakia). 
The Commission report on the existence of an excessive deﬁ  cit shall take into account “all other 
relevant factors”, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the Member 
State. While “all other relevant factors” are not speciﬁ  ed in detail, countries are invited to put 
forward any factor considered relevant. Reference to the ﬁ  nancial or economic crisis as a relevant 
factor did not materially affect the decision on the existence of an excessive deﬁ  cit in 2009.
In setting the initial deadline for the correction of the excessive deﬁ  cit (Treaty Article 126.7), the 
relevant provisions allow the Council in its recommendation to extend the standard time frame 
of correction in the year after the identiﬁ  cation of the excessive deﬁ  cit, in case there are “special 
circumstances”; the deadline would then be set as a rule to the second year after the identiﬁ  cation 
of the excessive deﬁ  cit. The overall assessment of the existence of special circumstances should 
1  Prepared by Philipp Rother.
2  See Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 on “Speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deﬁ  cit procedure” and the Code of Conduct on the “Speciﬁ  cations on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”.64
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take into account “all relevant factors” as mentioned above in a balanced manner. This provision 
was applied in 2009 for 11 euro area EDP countries (with the exceptions of Greece and Malta) 
to justify a delayed correction of an excessive deﬁ  cit on the basis of the argument that additional 
ﬁ  scal tightening in a weak economic environment could prolong the recession. Also when 
effective action in response to the Council recommendation has been taken and then “unexpected 
adverse economic events” occur, the deadline for the correction of the excessive deﬁ  cit may 
be extended by one year. This provision was applied in December 2009 for Ireland, Spain and 
France. In the case of Greece, the Council established that the action taken in response to its 
recommendations has been insufﬁ  cient (Treaty Article 126.8). In this case, the deadline cannot 
be extended and the Council moved to the next stage of the EDP procedure of giving notice to 
Greece (Treaty Article 126.9).
Preventive arm
Under the preventive arm of the SGP, EU countries commit to adhere to their country-speciﬁ  c 
medium-term objectives (MTOs), as speciﬁ  ed in cyclically adjusted terms net of one-off and other 
temporary measures.3 This should provide a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deﬁ  cit 
limit and ensure rapid progress towards ﬁ  scal sustainability while allowing room for budgetary 
manoeuvre, in particular taking into account public investment needs. The annual structural 
adjustment effort towards the MTO should be higher than the minimum benchmark of 0.5% 
of GDP in “good times” and could be more limited in “bad times”. Moreover, the Commission 
may issue policy advice to encourage Member States to stick to the structural adjustment path 
towards their MTO, as it did in 2008 in the cases of France and Romania. 
The focus on the structural budget balance allows countries (in particular those that have already 
achieved their MTO) to let automatic stabilisers operate freely over the business cycle, while 
respecting the 3% of GDP deﬁ  cit limit. This provides room for budgetary manoeuvre to avoid 
pro-cyclical ﬁ  scal policies in particular in bad times. Given the nature and depth of the 2008-09 
crisis, however, a precise quantiﬁ  cation and interpretation of structural budget balances taking 
3  See Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 on “The strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies” and the Code of Conduct on the “Speciﬁ  cations on the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact”. 
Overview of excessive deficit procedures for euro area countries, end-2009
Date of the Commission 
report under Article 126.3
Council Decision 
on the existence of an 
excessive deﬁ  cit
Initial deadline 
for the correction 
of an excessive deﬁ  cit
Extended deadline
Belgium 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2012  : 
Germany 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2013  : 
Ireland 18.02.2009   27.04.2009  2013  2014 
Greece  18.02.2009  27.04.2009  2010  no effective action 
Spain 18.02.2009   27.04.2009  2012  2013 
France 18.02.2009   27.04.2009  2012  2013 
Italy 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2012  : 
Malta 13.05.2009   07.07.2009  2010  : 
Netherlands 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2013 : 
Austria 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2013  : 
Portugal 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2013  : 
Slovenia 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2013  : 
Slovakia 07.10.2009   02.12.2009  2013  : 65
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Lessons for strengthening the implementation 
of the EU ﬁ  scal framework in post-crisis times 
emerge in particular in two areas. First, a lack of 
high-quality information may have impeded an 
accurate assessment of the ﬁ  scal situation in the 
individual countries before the crisis. Second, 
the weighting of the different incentives driving 
government actions may have shifted during 
the crisis. The question is how to enhance 
the effectiveness of the existing surveillance 
and incentive mechanisms in preventing 
the emergence and later materialisation of 
substantial ﬁ  scal risks.
WAYS TO STRENGTHEN EU FISCAL SURVEILLANCE
EU  ﬁ   scal surveillance is based upon two 
quantitative assessments: the assessment 
of the cyclical state of the economy and the 
assessment of its impact on the ﬁ  scal balance. 
In particular, this requires an assessment of the 
evolution of the output gap and macroeconomic 
tax bases, and the application of tax elasticities 
with respect to relevant macroeconomic bases. 
Both assessments have proved to be subject to 
signiﬁ  cant uncertainties. The size of the output 
gap, in particular, but also the evolution of an 
output gap are extremely difﬁ  cult to estimate in 
real time in a normal business cycle – and even 
more so in buoyant times and in crisis times 
(see also Cimadomo, 2008).
In light of the uncertainty surrounding estimates 
of the underlying ﬁ   scal balances, future 
quantitative assessments will need to be more 
prudent. Estimates of potential output should 
be conservative and forward-looking in order 
to assess the structural position of the economy 
over a longer-term horizon. In this regard, useful 
complementary indicators might be the current 
account balance, measures of competitiveness, 
household and corporate indebtedness, the 
structural unemployment rate, trends in asset 
prices, etc. As noted by Morris et al. (2009), 
with regard to tax elasticities, or more generally 
the link between macroeconomic and ﬁ  scal 
developments, the reliability of the estimated 
underlying  ﬁ   scal position is likely to remain 
limited.
Given the uncertainty regarding trend 
output and revenues, a prudent conduct of 
expenditure policies is crucial. The experience 
from past boom phases shows that maintaining 
expenditure ratios (expressed in relation to 
GDP) in fast-growing economies can lead to 
ﬁ  scal vulnerability as part of the (permanent) 
expenditure increases are ﬁ  nanced  from 
cyclical and sometimes highly volatile 
(e.g. asset price-based) tax revenues. A more 
prudent approach is to link expenditure growth 
to a sustainable long-term growth rate of the 
economy, which would induce a tendency 
towards possibly large ﬁ   scal surpluses in 
boom periods.
As noted above, in view of the projected sharp 
increase in government debt ratios in many 
euro area countries, as well as the assumption 
of contingent liabilities, the surveillance of debt 
developments will need to be strengthened. 
In this context, it will also be necessary to 
develop further the analysis of countries’ 
short-term reﬁ   nancing needs as an indication 
of vulnerability to negative shocks affecting 
market conﬁ  dence. 
The stability programmes are a further source 
of  ﬁ   scal surveillance of a more qualitative 
due account of cyclical, one-off and other (such as asset price) effects appears extremely difﬁ  cult. 
Thus, it appears somewhat unlikely that in a crisis situation strong policy recommendations could 
be derived under the preventive arm of the SGP.
Overall, the rules of the Treaty and the SGP provide considerable ﬂ  exibility to take the effects 
of the crisis into account in the implementation of the EU ﬁ  scal surveillance framework. As a 
matter of principle, this ﬂ  exibility must be applied in a prudent and judicious manner in order not 
to endanger the credibility of the legal provisions.66
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nature. The programmes should be based on 
realistic and cautious growth assumptions 
and could focus more on the identiﬁ  cation of 
macroeconomic and ﬁ  scal risks. A ﬁ  rst step in 
this direction could be to present an unchanged 
policy scenario in the programme that would 
identify the consolidation gap that has to be 
ﬁ  lled in order to achieve government targets. 
Moreover, the discussion of government 
policy intentions could focus more on quality 
aspects. In this regard, further investigation of 
the durability of ﬁ  scal consolidation plans may 
be useful, e.g. to highlight risks from revenue-
based structural adjustments, in particular if 
they derive from small and cyclically sensitive 
tax bases, or consolidations based on ad hoc 
expenditure cuts. 
With regard to the data situation for assessing 
the state of public ﬁ  nances, Member States are 
obliged to provide timely, reliable and complete 
information. As suggested by Onorante et al. 
(2008), improving the availability of infra-annual 
budgetary data could help ﬁ  scal surveillance to 
be more up to date. As regards data reliability, 
frequent and unexpectedly large revisions of 
government  ﬁ   nance statistics and forecasts 
hamper a proper ﬁ   scal policy assessment at 
the EU level. To improve the situation in 
this respect, independent national statistical 
institutes and national “watchdogs” could play 
a useful role. More comprehensive information 
on the size of contingent government liabilities 
would also be important for assessing the true 
magnitude of ﬁ  scal risks.
It should be borne in mind that information 
problems are not only of a technical nature, 
as discussed so far, but they may also have 
important policy implications. Reliable 
information that is comparable across countries 
is necessary to anchor the way of thinking 
about ﬁ  scal developments in individual member 
countries and EMU as a whole. An insufﬁ  cient 
quality of such information signiﬁ  cantly reduces 
the accuracy of policy analysis and effectiveness 
of decision-making, both at the national and EU 
levels. Commonly agreed concepts and adequate 
statistics for the assessment of ﬁ  scal  policies 
are a precondition for effective peer pressure to 
meet the ﬁ  scal policy objectives and to underpin 
the credibility of EU ﬁ  scal surveillance. 
WAYS TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL INCENTIVES 
FOR FISCAL DISCIPLINE
Market perceptions of countries’ solvency 
risks as reﬂ   ected in sovereign bond spreads 
and credit default swap (CDS) premia provide 
a welcome disciplining mechanism to national 
governments. Before the crisis, market pressures 
were virtually non-existent, as evidenced 
by very narrow sovereign bond spreads and 
similar high sovereign credit ratings across 
euro area countries. During the crisis, the 
weight of the different incentive mechanisms 
has changed. Market pressures have gained in 
importance, with sovereign bond spreads and 
CDS premia rising to unprecedented levels 
and close attention of investors to possible 
short-term  ﬁ  nancing  difﬁ   culties in individual 
euro area countries. While these spreads and 
premia subsided in the course of 2009, in many 
instances they remain elevated compared with 
pre-crisis levels.
While ﬁ  nancial market indicators can provide 
supportive information to guide national 
ﬁ   scal policies, exclusive reliance on such 
indicators could result in misjudgements. 
The evidence presented in Chapter 4 shows 
that in crisis episodes ﬁ  nancial markets appear 
to differentiate between sovereign issuers 
according to the sustainability of their public 
ﬁ   nances. However, there are indications that 
other factors, such as liquidity premia and 
international risk aversion, also play a role 
(see Box 4 in Chapter 4). Thus, inferences for the 
conduct of ﬁ  scal policies could be problematic. 
Furthermore, the accuracy of short-term market 
indicators in quantifying sustainability risks 
may be questionable as investors may overreact 
to changes in fundamentals. Finally, reductions 
in sovereign bond spreads or CDS premia could 
be misinterpreted as signalling progress in 
consolidation efforts. 
Additional policy incentives to support 
countries’ compliance with the EU ﬁ  scal 67
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framework could be established on the domestic 
side. Any strengthening of national political and 
public ownership of the EU ﬁ  scal rules would 
be helpful.56 The large post-crisis ﬁ  scal 
imbalances may trigger widespread public 
support for new, complementary institutions and 
binding medium-term-oriented national ﬁ  scal 
policy frameworks. For example, constitutional 
budget rules,57 national stability pacts and multi-
year budgetary targets could promote exit 
strategies from the current ﬁ  scal loosening and 
strengthen incentives for ﬁ  scal  consolidation 
and the return to sound medium-term budgetary 
objectives. Furthermore, independent Fiscal 
Policy Councils could be set up to critically 
monitor, forecast and assess ﬁ  scal developments 
and evaluate the risks for ﬁ  scal sustainability in 
regular public reports. National monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms could contribute to 
fulﬁ   lling the EU budgetary objectives if the 
national rules are consistent with those at the 
EU level. Suggestions for a greater involvement 
of national parliaments have also been made. 
This avenue was also discussed during the 
negotiations on the revision of the SGP, but at 
the time resulted in little concrete progress.
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Once the recovery is evident, governments need 
to start exiting from the ﬁ  scal stimulus and shift 
to substantial ﬁ   scal consolidation in order to 
return to sound and sustainable ﬁ  scal positions. 
Fiscal exit and consolidation strategies should 
be well speciﬁ   ed, duly communicated and 
implemented in a timely manner in order to 
maintain conﬁ   dence in longer-term ﬁ  scal 
sustainability. The existing EU ﬁ  scal framework, 
as embedded in the relevant provisions of 
the Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact, provides the appropriate coordination 
mechanism. In this respect, the precedent 
of coordinated ﬁ   scal expansions within the 
framework of the European Economic Recovery 
Plan calls for particular attention. To prevent the 
risk of an erosion of the EU ﬁ  scal framework, it 
is important that the provisions of the Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact are fully respected 
and implemented in a strict manner.
From the recent ﬁ   scal developments, the 
following lessons emerge for the implementation 
of the EU ﬁ   scal framework in post-crisis 
times. First, at the EU level, only high-quality 
information will enable an accurate assessment 
of the ﬁ   scal situation in individual countries. 
In this respect, the existing EU ﬁ  scal surveillance 
process – also with regard to the reliability of 
ﬁ  scal data – needs to be strengthened. Second, 
outside crisis times, market incentives are often 
not sufﬁ  ciently strong to promote sound national 
ﬁ  scal policies. Moreover, the EU’s institutional 
incentives for ensuring ﬁ  scal discipline face a 
number of challenges. Therefore, at the national 
level, effective complementary institutions, 
binding medium-term ﬁ  scal policy frameworks 
as well as strong monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms could be put in place to ensure 
ﬁ  scal discipline in both good and bad economic 
times. Overall, both at the EU level and the 
national level, a more powerful application and 
enforcement of the EU ﬁ  scal rules for sound and 
sustainable ﬁ  scal positions will be required.
See also Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) for empirical results  56 
regarding the beneﬁ  ts of domestic ﬁ  scal rules.
An example is the new constitutional deﬁ  cit rule that has been  57 
adopted in Germany (see Kastrop et al., 2009). 68
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7  EARLY LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS  58 
This Occasional Paper has reviewed the response 
from euro area governments to the ﬁ  nancial and 
economic crisis, the reaction of ﬁ  nancial markets 
and the impact on the longer-term sustainability 
of their public ﬁ  nances. While it is too early for 
a full assessment of the conduct of euro area 
ﬁ  scal policies during the crisis, some preliminary 
lessons for the future may already be drawn by 
considering ﬁ  ve key questions:59
1) Were governments well prepared for a crisis, 
going into it with healthy public ﬁ  nances? 
The EU ﬁ  scal framework evidently helped to 
contain the crisis-related ﬁ  scal  imbalances, 
although it was not able to prevent them. In this 
respect, the crisis has demonstrated the vital 
importance of establishing and maintaining 
sound  ﬁ   scal positions, in line with or even 
exceeding medium-term objectives of a budget 
close to balance or in surplus. While such ﬁ  scal 
positions may not be shock-proof to a crisis of 
the size that the euro area countries faced in 
2008-09, with a better starting position than most 
of them had going into the crisis, they would 
have had more room for budgetary manoeuvre. 
This is a strong argument for a more powerful 
enforcement of sound national ﬁ  scal policies at 
the EU level.  
2) Have the ﬁ  scal authorities responded to the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis with due regard to the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts for taxpayers? The upfront ﬁ  scal costs 
of the bank bailouts for the taxpayer have been 
substantial and there are major further ﬁ  scal 
risks. However, given the creation of market-
based incentives for the banks to withdraw from 
the government support, the ﬁ  scal costs may be 
(partly) recovered over time, depending on how 
fast the ﬁ  nancial industry and the economy at 
large recover from the damages caused by the 
crisis. The net ﬁ  scal costs of the bank rescue 
measures are difﬁ  cult to gauge at this stage and 
have to be weighed against the economic and 
social beneﬁ  ts of the successful stabilisation of 
the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
3) Was their ﬁ  scal activism in reaction to the 
economic downturn both effective and efﬁ  cient? 
The coordinated ﬁ  scal stimulus measures taken 
to prevent a free fall of economic activity appear 
to have been effective in building a “bridge” 
to the recovery – arguably more effective than 
could have been expected. At the same time, 
some doubts exist as to the timeliness of ﬁ  scal 
stimuli that are still in the pipeline for 2010 
and whether the extra public money has always 
been allocated efﬁ   ciently and will indeed be 
temporary. As the automatic ﬁ  scal  stabilisers 
are large in the euro area, they provided a 
very important ﬁ  rst line of defence against the 
economic slowdown. Still, both ﬁ  scal activism 
and automatic stabilisers appear to be subject to 
decreasing returns, the more ﬁ  scal stability itself 
is impaired.
4)  Have governments taken care to counter 
the risks to ﬁ  scal sustainability and to support 
conﬁ  dence? After the 2008-09 crisis, most euro 
area countries face excessive deﬁ  cits,  rising 
debt-to-GDP ratios and substantial contingent 
liabilities. Greater prudence in allowing the 
free and full operation of automatic stabilisers 
and in carrying out ﬁ  scal stimulus measures, in 
particular when they lead to or enlarge excessive 
deﬁ   cits, would seem warranted. The huge 
debt (re)ﬁ  nancing needs of governments could 
drive up real interest rates, raise expectations 
of higher tax rates in the future and crowd out 
private demand in the recovery phase. Also the 
ﬁ   nancing of increasing interest payments on 
government debt, either through a reduction of 
non-interest spending or higher taxes, is likely 
to have negative consequences for longer-term 
growth. To support public conﬁ  dence, there is 
a clear need to credibly anchor any coordinated 
short-term  ﬁ   scal impulse into a timely and 
ambitious exit and consolidation strategy that 
ensures longer-term ﬁ   scal sustainability and 
Prepared by Ad van Riet. 58 
For a discussion of the lessons for the three building blocks of  59 
the EU’s crisis management framework (crisis prevention, crisis 
control and mitigation, and crisis resolution), see European 
Commission (2009c).69
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FROM THE CRISIS focuses on expenditure reforms. This will create 
positive conﬁ   dence effects, lower sovereign 
default risk premia and sustain economic 
growth.
5) Has the ﬂ  exibility of the Stability and Growth 
Pact in “bad times” been applied with prudence 
and have the rules for ﬁ   scal discipline been 
observed? The provisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact provided considerable ﬂ  exibility to 
take the exceptional circumstances of the crisis 
into account. While the rules aimed at correcting 
excessive deﬁ  cits have so far been observed, in 
setting (extended) deadlines for bringing deﬁ  cits 
below 3% of GDP, they were stretched to the 
limit. The real test of euro area countries’ ﬁ  scal 
discipline and their commitment to correcting 
excessive deﬁ  cits in a timely fashion (without 
resorting to creative accounting) will however 
only come when they have to implement their 
exit and consolidation strategies. To create 
appropriate national incentives for ﬁ  scal 
discipline, strong domestic budgetary rules and 
institutions as well as effective monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms should complement 
the EU ﬁ  scal framework.
The overall lesson from the crisis is that 
governments must strengthen ﬁ  scal discipline to 
ensure the longer-term sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances. Fiscal sustainability is a vital condition 
for the stability and smooth functioning of 
EMU. Large ﬁ   scal imbalances fuel inﬂ  ation 
expectations and place an additional burden 
on the conduct of the single monetary policy. 
Moreover, they contribute to a widening of 
macroeconomic imbalances within the euro 
area, which in turn increase vulnerabilities 
of individual member countries to negative 
shocks. As the 2008-09 experience has shown, 
ﬁ   scal sustainability is also a prerequisite for 
governments to be able to respond to ﬁ  nancial 
and economic crises. In turn, sustainable public 
ﬁ  nances require a stable ﬁ  nancial system and a 
ﬂ  exible economy that are able to sustain output 
growth and employment creation. Governments 
should therefore also tackle the risks to ﬁ  scal 
sustainability by ensuring high-quality public 
ﬁ   nances and enhancing structural reforms, 
as this will promote economic ﬂ  exibility  and 
potential growth. 
Finally, care must be taken to prevent perverse 
incentives from the widespread state interventions 
in the economy. The perception is that taxpayers 
will step in again with unlimited support if 
systemic ﬁ  nancial institutions were to be on the 
brink of collapse. This perception feeds “moral 
hazard” in the sense that the banking sector has 
an incentive to take excessive risks, which in 
case they materialise would be borne by society, 
while the banks’ private stakeholders have little 
incentive to correct such risk-seeking behaviour.60 
Moreover, the coordinated ﬁ  scal  stimulus 
measures in response to the economic crisis may 
have created expectations that governments will 
again initiate such joint actions in the future, 
even in a normal slowdown – if necessary 
stretching again the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. A genuine ﬁ   scal exit strategy 
should thus also cover the question of how to 
avoid such perverse incentives and more 
generally how to scale back again the role of the 
state in the economy to sustainable and efﬁ  cient 
proportions. The importance of this goes well 
beyond government budgets, as sustainable and 
high-quality public ﬁ  nances are a key condition 
for price stability, ﬁ   nancial stability and 
long-term growth, and thereby for the smooth 
functioning of EMU.
See Alessandri and Haldane (2009) and Van den End et al.  60 
(2009).70
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